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Accounting Conservatism and Bankruptcy Risk 
 
Abstract 
This study examines the relation between accounting conservatism and bankruptcy risk using a 
large sample of U.S listed firms. We present evidence that unconditional and conditional 
conservatism generally are negatively associated with subsequent bankruptcy risk by creating 
cushions for bad times and reducing information asymmetry between borrower firms and 
debtholders. We identify two channels for the observed associations: Enhancing cash holdings 
and constraining earnings management. Using a two-stage analysis approach and using 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) enactment in 2002 as exogenous shocks, we show that accounting 
conservatism does have a mitigating effect on bankruptcy risk.  
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Accounting Conservatism and Bankruptcy Risk 
I. INTRODUCTION 
This study examines the relation between accounting conservatism and bankruptcy risk. 
Conservative financial reporting refers to timelier reporting losses and bad earnings news than 
reporting gains and good earnings news. Accounting conservatism is a traditional accounting 
rationale that arose at least a millennium ago in response to demand by capital providers to assist 
their lending and liquidation decisions (De Ste. Croix 1956; Watts 2003; Basu 2009). Despite its 
potential significance, prior research has paid little attention to its relation with bankruptcy risk. 
If conservatism is found to lower bankruptcy risk, this evidence would be salient to 
contemporary debtholders, shareholders, and other stakeholders, whose interests are adversely 
affected by firm failures especially during crises times. Moreover, the financial crises of 2008-
2009 heighten interests in searching mechanisms and tools that inhibit bankruptcy contagions 
along supply chains and across industries. Related evidence could further inform that 
conservative reporting could be a potentially useful tool for dampening bankruptcy risk 
contagions. 
However, available evidence suggests different predictions regarding the association 
between conservative reporting and bankruptcy risk. On the one hand, Gigler, Kanodia, and  
Venugopalan (2009) argue analytically that accounting conservatism encourages the inefficient 
liquidation of profitable investment projects; and Zhang (2008) reports that conservatism 
accelerates debt covenant violations, both of which imply that conservative reporting increases 
bankruptcy risk. On the other hand, other studies suggest that accounting conservatism decreases 
bankruptcy risk. For example, Gao (2013) demonstrates analytically that conservatism reduces 
earnings management and debt renegotiation inefficiency; and Ahmed et al. (2002) and 
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Wittenberg-Moerman (2008) show that higher conservatism is associated with lower cost of debt, 
and by inference, lower failure risk. Thus, the question of whether and how accounting 
conservatism relates to bankruptcy risk remains an open question. 
We propose that accounting conservatism decrease subsequent bankruptcy risk through its 
cushioning role and informational role. By understating net income and assets, conservative 
reporting reduces the proportion distributable to contracting counterparties, thus allowing the 
firm to retain more cash and other assets. Conservatism also promotes precautionary cash 
savings and creates cushions when future earning is risky. In addition, rather than passively 
retaining cash savings; conservatism also promotes efficient reinvestment that increases future 
cash flows and cushions (García Lara, Garcia Osma, and Penalva 2015). This cushioning role of 
conservatism enhances firms’ capacities to repay or renegotiate their debts as it increases 
liquidation values and debtholder rights that deter managers’ strategic defaults and bankruptcy 
threats, thus lowering bankruptcy risk (Kim, Ramaswamy, and Sundaresan 1993; Uhrig-
Homburg 2005; Campbell, Hilscher, and Szilagyi 2008). Second, we propose that conservative 
accounting also plays an informational role whereby the timely reporting of bad earnings news 
reduces information asymmetries between debtholders and the firm (Watts 2003; Ahmed, 
Billings, Morton, and Stanford-Harris et al. 2002; Wittenberg-Moerman 2008; Kothari, Shu, and 
Wysocki 2009; Gao 2013), thus facilitating access to capital and debt renegotiations. This in turn 
helps the firm avert bankruptcy filings (Giammarino 1989; Mooradian 1994).  
We examine both the cash holdings and earnings management as two channels to 
substantiate how accounting conservatism affects bankruptcy risk through its cushioning and 
informational roles. We also examine unconditional and conditional conservatism separately for 
the following reasons. Unconditional conservatism reflects conservative financial reporting 
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practices that were applied consistently over multiple periods, whereas conditional conservatism 
focuses on financial reporting practices that trigger more timely recognition of bad versus good 
earnings news. These two types of conservatism therefore affect bankruptcy risk in subtly 
different ways — the former is especially efficacious in creating cushions and the latter at 
reducing information asymmetries between firms and debtholders.  
We construct a large sample of firm-year observations of non-financial U.S. listed firms for 
the period 1989–2007. Our sample period ends in 2007 to avoid potential confounding effects of 
the financial crisis on the conservatism-bankruptcy risk relation. Our main tests employ two sets 
of bankruptcy risk measures: (i) An unconditional bankruptcy risk measure derived from 
Campbell et al. (2008); and (ii) a conditional bankruptcy risk measure derived from Merton 
(1974). Both measures are important because our sample includes healthy firms whose 
bankruptcy does not rely on financial distress as well as distressed firms whose bankruptcy does 
progress with distress. We measure unconditional conservatism using factor scores from the 
principal component analyses (PCA) of three unconditional conservatism metrics used in prior 
studies: Total accruals (Ahmed and Duellman 2007; Iliev 2010), industry-adjusted book-to-
market ratios (Ahmed et al. 2002; Zhang 2008), and hidden reserves (Penman and Zhang 2002). 
Similarly, we gauge conditional conservatism using factor scores from the PCA of three 
component measures too: Accumulated non-operating accruals (Zhang 2008); an extended 
measure of Khan and Watts’ (2009) C-scores; and a conservatism ratio measure adapted from 
Callen, Segal, and Hope (2010). We employ ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions with fixed 
time effects and with t-statistics adjusted for firm-level clustering for the primary tests, and 
follow Baron and Kenney (1986) for the channel tests. 
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Empirical analyses yield the following main results: First, unconditional and conditional 
conservatism are both negatively associated with subsequent unconditional and conditional 
bankruptcy risk, respectively. The findings support the prediction that accounting conservatism 
helps reduce bankruptcy risk by creating cushions and reducing information asymmetries. 
Second, unconditional and conditional conservatism enhance cash holdings, which in turn 
decrease subsequent bankruptcy risk, and they constrain opportunistic earnings management that 
increases subsequent bankruptcy risk. The results lend support to predictions that accounting 
conservatism reduces bankruptcy risk via the cash holding channel and earnings management 
channel.  
In further analyses, we use a two-stage approach to check whether our baseline results are 
sensitive to the reverse causality from bankruptcy risk to conservatism. We also use the 
enactment of Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) in 2002 that enhances conservative reporting (Lobo and 
Zhou 2006; Iliev 2010), as exogenous shock to conservatism, to check whether conservatism 
affect bankruptcy risk or not. We find that the negative relation between conservatism and 
bankruptcy risk is robust to the reverse causality considered, and becomes stronger in the post-
SOX period, confirming that conservatism does mitigate bankruptcy risk. Our main findings hold 
even after controlling for income smoothing, extreme distress, and using alternative measures of 
bankruptcy risk and accounting conservatism. However, in firms whose debts are referenced by 
CDS contracts, the negative relation between conservative reporting and bankruptcy risk 
weakens or disappears, possibly because CDS contracts qualitatively change debt contracting 
relations by alleviating lenders’ monitoring incentives and their willingness to re-negotiate debts.  
This study contributes to existing literature in several ways. First, our study provides 
original evidence that both unconditional and conditional conservatism generally mitigate firm 
5 
 
bankruptcy, the later stage of debt contracting. This evidence extends prior studies on the role of 
conservative accounting for technical defaults in the early stage of debt contracting (Zhang 2008; 
Nikolaev 2010), and for ultimate recovery rates in the post-bankruptcy stage of debt contracting 
(Donovan, Frankel, and Martin 2015). In addition, we document that cash enhancement and 
earnings management mitigation serve as two channels through which conservative reporting 
reduces bankruptcy risk.  
Second, evidence in this study adds to the bankruptcy risk literature by showing that 
conservative accounting is an accounting-based determinant of bankruptcy risk in general. Prior 
studies identify cash holdings (Kim et al. 1993; Uhrig-Homburg 2005; Campbell et al. 2008), 
and information asymmetry (Giammarino 1989; Mooradian 1994) as determinants of bankruptcy 
risk. Complementing these studies, we show that both unconditional and conditional 
conservative accounting relates with bankruptcy risk via its impact on these two determinants, 
i.e., cash holdings and information asymmetries. 
Third, our findings also have both practical and policy implications. Conservative 
accounting is a potentially useful accounting-based tool for stakeholders, regulators, and 
policymakers to mitigate bankruptcy risk and its contagion. Our evidence is also relevant to 
accounting standard setters by informing the continuing role of conservative accounting as a 
central tenet of financial reporting.  
II. PRIOR FINDINGS AND HYPOTHESES 
Relations between Unconditional and Conditional Conservatism and Bankruptcy Risk 
Figure 1 depicts the debt-contracting continuum along which firms evolve from financial 
health to bankruptcy (T = 0 to T = 3). Accounting conservatism accelerates technical defaults by 
triggering violations of accounting-based covenants (Figure 1, T = 1). Yet prior anecdotal 
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evidence and research suggest that unconditional and conditional conservatism should lower 
bankruptcy risk, via the cushioning and informational roles of accounting conservatism.1 First, 
we consider the cushioning role. By understating reported net income and assets and by reporting 
bad news in a timelier manner, accounting conservatism reduces the proportion distributable to 
contracting parties, thus preserving more cash and other fungible assets within a firm. Especially 
when future cash flows become riskier, accounting conservatism promotes precautionary savings 
and helps prudent firms to save more (Kirschenheiter and Ramakrishnan 2010). Increased cash 
and fungible assets enhance a firm’s capacity to repay and renegotiate debts, thus reducing 
bankruptcy risk (Kim et al. 1993; Uhrig-Homburg 2005; Campbell et al. 2008). This cushioning 
function of accounting conservatism also increases liquidation values and supports debtholder 
liquidation rights in the advent of real defaults (Figure 1, T = 2) as shown by Carrizosa and Ryan 
(2013), which in turn strengthen liquidation threats to managers and deter managers from 
suboptimal strategic defaults and bankruptcy filings. Whereas Zhang (2008) reports that 
conservatism accelerates the violation of earnings- or asset-based debt covenants (Figure 1, T = 1) 
that may appear to hasten bankruptcies (Figure 1, T = 3), the opposite is true in reality. 
Accelerated technical defaults due to conservatism facilitate the transfer of control rights from 
shareholders to debtholders and promote debtholder monitoring (Zhang 2008; Sufi 2009; 
Nikolaev 2010), which mitigates underinvestment and improves operating cash flows in 
covenant-violating firms (Tan 2013). Improved operating cash flows in turn enhance firms’ 
abilities to service and renegotiate debts (Chatterjee, Dhillon, and Ramirez 1995), thus reducing 
                                                 
1 Anecdotal evidence suggests that counter-conservatism contributes to financial distress. For instance, AIG insured financial 
institutions but did not accrue related contingent liabilities before the 2008–2009 financial crisis. When the crisis arose, AIG 
experienced large losses and would have been forced into bankruptcy without a government bailout. Similarly, before 2007, the 
subsequently bankrupt GM reported pension assets and liabilities as off-balance-sheet items under SFAS No. 87 rather than as 
contingent liabilities following SFAS No. 5, since before 2007, SFAS No. 87 allowed firms to report estimated net pension 
liabilities in the footnotes to the financial statements as an exception to SFAS No. 5. 
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bankruptcy risk. 
Second, by reporting bad earnings news in a timelier manner and understating reported net 
income and assets, accounting conservatism also plays an informational role of alleviating the 
information asymmetry between the firm and debtholders. For example, Ahmed et al. (2002) and 
Wittenberg-Moerman (2008) document that conservatism decreases information asymmetry 
between managers and debtholders, which in turn reduces the cost of debt. Giammarino (1989) 
and Mooradian (1994) demonstrate that with severe information asymmetry, poorly informed 
debtholders prefer bankruptcy to debt renegotiation. However, lower information asymmetry due 
to conservatism facilitates debt renegotiation and thus helps to avoid bankruptcy filings. 
Specifically, it reduces the complexity of contract bargaining (Samuelson 1984), shortens the 
bankruptcy bargaining process by requiring fewer reorganization plans (Carapeto 2005), and 
increases the frequency and scope of debt renegotiations (Nikolaev 2013).2 
Whereas unconditional and conditional conservatism play both cushioning and 
informational roles, they do so with nuanced differences. Unconditional conservatism, by 
consistently understating net assets and net income, actuates the accumulation of accrual 
cushions and precautionary savings, which ex ante insulates the firm from later risk realizations 
and buffers shocks to future cash flows (Lins et al. 2010). Meanwhile, it also reduces information 
asymmetries between debtholders and the firm. In comparison, conditional conservatism, by 
recognizing realized downside risk ex post and reporting bad news as losses in a timelier manner 
than good news as gains, performs more of an informational role than a cushioning role (Ryan 
2006).  
                                                 
2 In the corporate bond setting, Duffie and Lando (2001) also analytically show that accounting information that reduces 
information asymmetry between bondholders and the firm is priced and negatively associated with bond spread. However, the 
major part of debt contracts is private debt contracts that involve more debt covenants and renegotiations, and stronger 
debtholders’ monitoring than corporate bonds. 
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Despite these subtle differences, the cushioning and informational roles of accounting 
conservatism predict negative relations between both unconditional and conditional conservatism 
and bankruptcy risk, as hypothesized below: 
H1: Unconditional and conditional conservatism are negatively associated with 
subsequent bankruptcy risk, all else being equal. 
 
To further substantiate the negative association hypothesized in H1 and provide new insights 
regarding how conservative reporting affects bankruptcy risk through its cushioning and 
informational roles, we next consider how cash holding enhancement and the constraining of 
earnings management operate as two potential channels for their relations. 
The Cash Holding Channel 
As explained earlier, we expect that accounting conservatism enhances a firm’s cash 
holdings, which provides the firm with some cushions in meeting its debt servicing obligations, 
and thus mitigates subsequent bankruptcy risk. A firm can be viewed as a nexus of contracts that 
are often conditioned on accounting numbers. By understating reported net earnings and assets, 
unconditional and conditional conservatism, which operate in conjunction with contracts that are 
conditioned on earnings or asset numbers, reduce cash distributable to many (if not all) relevant 
contracting counterparties. This facilitates more cash being retained within the firm, and thus 
enhances a firm’s cash position. Supporting this argument, Watts (2003) argues that 
conservatism reduces or defers cash expenditures for performance-based compensation, 
dividends and taxation. Zhang (2008) and Ahmed et al. (2002) reports that conservative 
reporting helps set lower interest rates in debt contract initiations and thus lowers cash interest 
payment ax ante, and lower cost of debt ex post, respectively. Hui et al. (2012) maintain that 
conservatism elicits more lenient contracting terms from suppliers and customers, which 
similarly facilitates cash retention. When future cash flows become riskier, the above mentioned 
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cash savings from varied contracts are more valuable for a firm’s survival. Therefore, firms also 
have incentives to use conservative accounting to promote precautionary cash saving, which is, 
saving cash by reducing expenditures as a response to uncertainty regarding future income.  
The notion that conservatism enhances cash cushions and precautionary cash savings does 
not mean that conservatism only encourages passively retaining cash and discourages optimal 
cash spending. Despite no direct evidence on cash reinvestment, prior studies show that in 
general, conservative reporting increases operating and investment cash flows by enhancing 
investment efficiency (Francis and Martin 2010; García Lara et al. 2015).3 These studies imply 
that conservatism further promotes optimal trade-offs between retaining cash and efficiently 
reinvesting cash in profitable opportunities, which ultimately enhances future cash flow and cash 
cushions. 
The cushioning role of conservatism or its cash-enhancing effect facilitates a firm’s 
abilities of debt servicing and debt renegotiations, which in turn mitigates bankruptcy risk. 
Because bankruptcy is ultimately a condition of cash insufficiency, and cash enhancement 
facilitates debt servicing, firms can operate indefinitely without entering real default or 
bankruptcy if net cash flows are sufficient to debt service obligations, irrespective of 
contemporaneous earnings. Correspondingly, Kim et al. (1993) and Uhrig-Homburg (2005) 
model bankruptcy as a real default triggered when cash flow falls below the required debt service 
payments. Campbell et al. (2008) document that cash holdings reduce failure risk over various 
prediction horizons. Enhanced cash holdings also alleviate underinvestment, particularly when 
firms face difficulties in rolling over debts (Harford, Klasa, and Maxwell 2014). This in turn 
                                                 
3 Francis and Martin (2010) report that timely loss recognition curbs overinvestment in acquisition settings, and García Lara et. al. 
(2015) find that conservative accounting improves investment efficiency in general by facilitating a firm’s access to debt 
financing and limiting underinvestment. 
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increases future operating cash flow and elevates debtholders’ beliefs in the firms’ abilities to 
service their debts, thus facilitating debt renegotiation and restructuring that preclude bankruptcy 
filings (Perotti and Spier 1993; Berkovitch and Israel 1998).4 
Admittedly, however, increased cash exacerbates free cash flow agency problems (Jensen 
1986) that increase bankruptcy risk, suggesting that cash enhancement due to conservatism may 
increase bankruptcy risk. Yet, Louis et al. (2012) show that conservatism mitigates agency 
problems associated with increased cash holdings, and Bates et al. (2009) report that increases in 
cash holdings are associated with low cash flow risk, to a greater extent, than with agency 
problems. Anderson and Carverhill (2012) further argue that holding cash to guard against real 
default serves shareholders’ interests even if doing so aggravates cash-related agency problems. 
In addition, the option of holding cash to repurchase debt also reduces bankruptcy risk (Mao 
2012; Mao and Tserlukevich 2012). Drawing on the analysis and existing evidence, we predict 
that accounting conservatism reduces subsequent bankruptcy risk by enhancing cash holdings, as 
expressed below: 
H2a: Unconditional and conditional conservatism reduce subsequent bankruptcy risk by 
enhancing cash holdings, all else being equal. 
 
The Earnings Management Channel 
Both unconditional and conditional conservatism constrains managers’ incentives to 
opportunistically manipulate earnings ex ante and to counteract the misstatement of earnings and 
assets ex post (Watts 2003; Ball and Shivakumar 2005; Chen et al. 2007; Kothari et al. 2009; 
Gao 2013). This effect of conservatism on earnings management is especially important after 
                                                 
4 Indeed, conservatism could also preserve productive assets and other non-cash assets that can always be sold to meet their cash 
need and thus also bankruptcy risk. However, markets for productive assets and other non-cash assets are usually not as liquid 
and efficient as stock markets, and these assets cannot be sold timely to meet cash need; for example, distressed firms usually 
have to fire-sale assets on hands at a discount, suggesting that non-cash assets cannot sufficiently satisfy cash need. Therefore, 
cash, rather than non-cash assets, is an effective channel for conservative reporting to affect bankruptcy risk. 
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firms commit technical defaults, because at that time financially healthy firms (distressed firms) 
are likely to be involved in upward (downward) earnings management to improve their 
bargaining power and reduce renegotiation cost in the subsequent debt renegotiation process (Jha 
2013). Earnings management increases the information asymmetry between the borrowing firm 
and creditors, which increases the incidence of bankruptcy and liquidation (Hotchkiss et al. 
2008). By constraining earnings management, conservatism serves to reduce relevant 
information asymmetry, thus facilitating debt renegotiations and helping the borrowing firm to 
avoid bankruptcy filings.  
However, Gigler et al. (2009) argue that conservatism increases debt renegotiation costs by 
creating false alarms, which increases information asymmetry and thus bankruptcy risk. 
Conversely, Gao (2013) demonstrates that after counterbalancing earnings management, 
conservatism does not generate false alarms, conveying that on balance conservatism should help 
mitigate bankruptcy risk by constraining earnings management. In addition, the above analysis 
does not address strategic bankruptcy, as strategic bankruptcy is rare to observe due to the huge 
bankruptcy cost associated therewith (Moulton and Thomas 1993). Combined, the above 
reasoning leads to the prediction presented below: 
H2b: Unconditional and conditional of conservative reporting reduce subsequent 
bankruptcy risk by constraining earnings management, all else being equal. 
 
III. DATA, MEASURES, AND MODELS 
Data 
This study utilizes a pooled sample of firm-year observations for firms listed on the NYSE, 
AMEX, and NASDAQ stock exchange for the period of fiscal years from 1989 to 2007. Data for 
bankruptcy risk, accounting conservatism, and channel measures are obtained from CRSP and 
Compustat. We obtain CDS contract data from the Markit CDS Composites database, and actual 
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bankruptcy data from the website www.bankruptcydata.com. Firm-years with missing values for 
conservatism measures, bankruptcy risk measures, stock prices, total assets, or net income before 
extraordinary items are deleted. In line with the lagged specifications of estimation models, firms 
with less than three years of listing history are excluded. We also delete post-bankruptcy firm-
years for firms filed under Chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, since they are not 
comparable with pre-bankruptcy observations. To reduce the effects of outliers, major variables 
are winsorized at the top and bottom 1% of their empirical distributions. Firms in financial 
industries (SIC codes 6000-6999) are excluded. The final sample consists of 34,897 firm-years 
for 4,621 non-financial firms. 
Measures for Bankruptcy Risk 
We define bankruptcy risk as the probability that a firm liquidates under Chapter 7 or 
reorganizes under Chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code when it cannot service its debt 
obligations. Our primary proxies for bankruptcy risk include both (i) a measure of bankruptcy 
risk conditional on distress, EDF, which is the expected default frequency derived from Merton 
(1974) and (ii) an unconditional bankruptcy risk measure, Campbell, a score derived from 
Campbell et al. (2008). Both measures are important because our sample includes both healthy 
firms whose bankruptcy is not conditional on distress, and distressed firms whose bankruptcy 
does progress with distress and are explained in more details below.   
EDF. EDF is the ranked probability that a firm’s assets fall below its liabilities after T 
periods (T = one year in this study), and is estimated following Merton (1974). Merton’s (1974) 
option-based structural model expresses a firm’s market value VE as a call option on the firm’s 
assets VA, with a strike price equal to the face value of the debt and a time to expiration equal to 
T. Applying the Black and Scholes’ (1973) formula and Ito’s lemma, we estimate EDF as: 
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         EDFt = prob{-[ln(VA,t / Xt) + (μ - 0.5σA2)T] / (σAT1/2) ≥ εt+T}                                              (1) 
     = N(-(ln(VA,t / Xt) + (μ - 0.5σA2)T) / (σAT1/2)) 
where N is the cumulative density function of the standard normal distribution, X is the face 
value of a firm’s debt, σA is the volatility of a firm’s assets, and μ is the instantaneous drift, 
assuming that a firm’s market value follows geometric Brownian motion. The intuition for EDF 
is that the probability that a firm’s assets are insufficient to pay the face value of its debt 
increases with debt and asset volatility and decreases with assets. Key advantages of using EDF 
for this study are that it is a market-based bankruptcy risk measure conditional on leverage (a 
proxy for distress); it is therefore less subject to estimation bias due to conservatism, and has 
superior predictability in comparison with accounting-based bankruptcy measures, such as the 
Altman (1968) Z-score and Ohlson (1980) O-score.5 
Campbell. Campbell is the ranked probability that a firm declares bankruptcy one month 
ahead. Similar to the classical Altman (1968) Z-score measure, Campbell is also calculated  by 
fitting a reduced form logit model.6 The logit model underlying Campbell mainly uses market-
based determinants, not conditional on financial distress, and allows information asymmetry 
between creditors and firms. 
In robustness checks, we also examine an extended Altman (1968) Z-score, Zscore, as an 
alternative unconditional bankruptcy risk measure, and a real bankruptcy indicator, BANK, as 
another alternative bankruptcy risk measure. The two measures are described below. 
                                                 
5 Merton’s (1974) model assumes market efficiency and complete information, and that default is the same as bankruptcy. It does 
not allow information asymmetry between firms and creditors and assumes away short-term default. As such, we implicitly relax 
these assumptions when examining relations between conservative reporting and conditional bankruptcy risk. 
6 We use the formula available in the last column of Table III of Campbell et al. (2008) to estimate Campbell for each fiscal-year 
end month: Campbellt = exp(tempt) / (1 + exp(tempt)), where tempt = -9.08 - 29.67 * NIMTAVGt + 3.36 * TLMTAt - 7.35 * 
EXRETAVGt + 1.48 * SIGMAt + 0.082 * Rsizet - 2.40 * CASHHMTAt + 0.054 * MBt - 0.937 * PRICEt. The intuition is that 
bankruptcy risk decreases with the predictability of market-based profitability NIMTAVG, the predictability of excess return 
relative to the S&P 500 index EXRETAVG, the market-based liquidity ratio CASHHMTA, and the stock price PRICE. Bankruptcy 
risk increases with the market-based leverage ratio TLMTA, the stock return volatility SIGMA, the market-to-book equity ratio 
MB, and the firm size relative to the S&P 500 index Rsize. 
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Zscore. Zscore is defined as the ranked value of negative one times the Altman (1968) Z-
score derived from a formula estimated from a logit model, and a higher Zscore indicates higher 
unconditional bankruptcy risk.7 As an accounting-based measure, Zscore is subject to biases 
caused by the understatement of net working capital, accumulated retained earnings, and total 
assets due to accounting conservatism. The impact of this bias on the relation between 
accounting conservatism and the Zscore is not readily predictable. 
BANK. BANK is an indicator variable that equals one if a firm files for bankruptcy under 
Chapter 7 or 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, and zero otherwise. Unlike other bankruptcy risk 
measures, BANK indicates realized bankruptcy in firms with high bankruptcy risk. However, the 
subsample of firms that declare bankruptcy is very small and possibly unrepresentative of firms 
with various levels of bankruptcy risk that eventually do not file for bankruptcy.8 
Measures for Unconditional and Conditional Conservatism 
There are many different measures for conservative reporting and they capture different 
dimensions of accounting conservatism and are subject to estimation errors. Accordingly, we use 
factor scores from the PCA of three unconditional conservatism metrics to capture their 
commonalities: UC_ACC (total accruals as adapted from Ahmed and Duellman 2007 and Iliev 
2010), UC_BM (the ranking of the industry-adjusted book-to-market ratio), and UC_RES 
(hidden reserves). We similarly use factor scores from the PCA of three conditional conservatism 
                                                 
7  The Z-score of Altman (1968) is calculated using the formula Z-score = 1.20*(net working capital/total assets) + 
1.40*(accumulated retained earnings/total assets) + 3.30*ROA + 0.60*(market equity/book debt) + 1.00*(sales/total assets).  
8 Several accounting studies argue that the CDS spread is a pure default risk measure and that the CDS setting enables cleaner 
tests of the effects of accounting practices on default risk (see Griffin (2014) for a comprehensive review). In our research setting, 
however, only a small subsample of firms has CDS contracts traded on the OTC market and thus available CDS spread data. 
More importantly, CDS contracts fundamentally change debt contracting relations. Specifically, by providing lenders hedges 
against credit risk, CDS contracts reduce lenders’ monitoring incentives and make it harder to renegotiate debts, thus increasing 
bankruptcy risk (Peristiani and Savino 2014; Subrahmanyam et al. 2014). These same considerations also decrease borrowing 
firms’ incentives to apply conservative reporting (Martin and Roychowdhury 2015). As a result, using the CDS spread data 
would confine our study to a small and special subsample with CDS contracts, which essentially changes debt contracting, whose 
conclusions would not generalize to the general debt contracting, and so we do not use CDS spread in this study. 
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metrics: CC_AR (extending Khan and Watts 2009), CC_CR (extending Callen et al. 2010), and 
CC_ACM (extending Zhang 2008). Below we describe their details. 
UC_ACC. UC_ACC is a component unconditional conservatism measure that is equal to 
negative one times the ratio of the average total accruals before depreciation to the average total 
assets, both averaged over a three-year horizon ending in the current year, following the rationale 
that conservatism results in persistent negative accruals (Givoly and Hayn 2000; Ahmed and 
Duellman 2007).9 
UC_BM. UC_BM is a component unconditional conservatism measure that is the ranking 
of negative one times the industry-adjusted ratio of the book-to-market value of equity (Ahmed 
and Duellman 2007; Zhang 2008). Since UC_BM also reflects expected economic rents and 
future growth opportunities, we use the R&D intensity as a control, following Ahmed and 
Duellman (2007). 
UC_RES. UC_RES is a component unconditional conservatism measure reflecting “hidden” 
reserves related to LIFO inventory accounting (INV), R&D (RD) and advertising (ADV). 
Extending Penman and Zhang (2002), we measure UC_RES as the ratio of hidden reserves to 
total assets (TA), as expressed in the formula UC_RESit = (INVitres + RDitres + ADVitres) / TAit.10 
Using the above three component unconditional conservatism measures, namely, UC_ACC, 
UN_BM, and UC_RES, we construct the following two proxies for unconditional conservatism:  
UC_PCA. UC_PCA is the main proxy for unconditional conservatism in our study. It is the 
factor score estimated in terms of the first factor from a PCA of the above three measures that 
                                                 
9 We calculate total accruals Total accruals by the following formula: Total accrualsit = net income before extraordinary itemsit - 
operating cash flowit + depreciation expenseit. 
10 INVitres is the LIFO reserve, RDitres is calculated using the coefficients of Lev and Sougiannis (1996) to capitalize and amortize 
R&D, and ADVitres is advertising expenses capitalized and amortized over two years, following Bublitz and Ettredge (1989). 
Penman and Zhang (2002) use net operating assets as the deflator for hidden reserves, but net operating assets are negative for 
over one-sixth of our sample, which could bias estimated hidden reserves. We thus use total assets as the deflator. When data are 
missing for the LIFO reserve, R&D and advertising expenses, they are set to zero. 
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gauge unconditional conservatism from different perspectives and possess distinct strengths and 
weaknesses. Specifically, UC_ACC is an accrual-based metric that cannot capture non-accrual 
unconditional conservatism such as R&D and advertising expenditures, whereas UC_RES 
captures only non-accrual unconditional conservatism relevant to hidden reserves. UC_BM is a 
market-based metric that reflects the understatement of the book equity relative to market equity. 
UC_PCA reflects commonalities of these measures in capturing unconditional conservatism. 
UC_AVG. UC_AVG is a secondary proxy for unconditional conservatism calculated as the 
average of the above three component measures. It can be perceived as a factor score from a 
special PCA that adopts an equal weighting scheme for component measures. 
CC_ACM. CC_ACM is a component conditional conservatism measure that is equal to 
negative one times the ratio of accumulated non-operating accruals over a three-year window to 
the corresponding accumulated total assets, adapted from Zhang (2008). A higher value of 
CC_ACM indicates a higher level of bad news reported via non-operational accruals.11 
CC_AR. CC_AR is a component conditional conservatism measure calculated as the ratio 
of the sum of the C Score and G Score to the G Score from Khan and Watts (2009).12 
CC_CR. CC_CR is a component conditional conservatism measure extending the CR ratio 
in Callen et al. (2010). It is the ratio of current earnings shocks to total earnings news for bad 
                                                 
11  Non-operating accruals are calculated as follows: Nonoperating accruals = Total accruals - Δaccounts receivable - 
Δinventories - Δprepaid expenses + Δaccounts payable + Δtaxes payable. Zhang (2008) uses the term “operational accrual”, 
which matches the definition of total accruals used by Ahmed and Duellman (2007). Following Zhang (2008), when operating 
cash flow is unavailable, total accruals are calculated as follows: Total accruals = net income + depreciation - funds from 
operations + Δcurrent assets - Δdebt - Δcurrent liabilities - Δcash. 
12 Our sample period, fiscal years 1989 through 2007, is similar to that of Khan and Watts (2009), 1963 through 2005, and our 
sample size is also similar. Hence, we use model 2 in Table 3 of Khan and Watts (2009) to estimate CC_AR as follows:  
CC_ARit = (C_Scoreit + G_Scoreit) / G_Scoreit  = 1 + C_Scoreit / G_Scoreit, 
G_Scoreit = m1 + m2Sizeit + m3M/Bit + m4 LEVit = 0.237 - 0.033*Sizei - 0.007*M/Bit + 0.033*LEVit, and 
C_Scoreit = l1 + l2Sizeit + l3M/Bit + l4LEVit = 0.031 + 0.005*Sizeit - 0.006*M/Bit + 0.005*LEVit. 
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earnings news, with the ratio multiplied by negative one for good earnings news.13 
Using the above three component conditional conservative measures, we construct the 
following two proxies for conditional conservatism measures:  
CC_PCA. CC_PCA is a proxy for conditional conservatism calculated as the factor score 
estimated in terms of the first factor from a PCA of the above three component measures that 
captures conditional conservatism from different perspectives and with distinct strengths and 
weaknesses. Specifically, CC_AR and CC_CR are market-based metrics subject to noise from 
voluntary disclosures of accounting and non-accounting information. CC_AR employs 
accounting inputs that may correlate with bankruptcy risk measures. CC_ACM is an accrual-
based metric that captures both bad news in accruals and “big baths” resulting from earnings 
manipulations and investment accruals. CC_PCA captures their commonalities in reflecting 
conditional conservatism. 
CC_AVG. CC_AVG is a secondary proxy for conditional conservatism calculated as the 
average of the above three component measures. It can be perceived as a factor score from a 
special PCA that adopts an equal weighting scheme for all component measures. 
Main Estimation Models 
To test H1, we estimate the following baseline regression equation in which bankruptcy 
risk in year t is linked to conservatism in year t-1 as specified below:  
                                                 
13 CC_CR is derived from Vuolteenaho (2002) and its criterion for classifying good versus bad news is whether the ROE, 
earnings scaled by the book equity, is greater than the risk-free rate. This definition differs from the CR ratio of Callen et al. 
(2010) by multiplying the CR ratio by negative one for good earnings news, so that higher CC_CR represents greater conditional 
conservatism for the good news case, and by keeping observations of negative CC_CR within the sample. The conditional 
conservatism measure CR ratio in Callen et al. (2010) is defined as the ratio of the current earnings shock to earnings news. For 
adverse earnings news, a positive CR ratio reflects asymmetric timeliness in the recognition of loss relative to gain. However, for 
good earnings news, a positive CR ratio reflects asymmetric timeliness in the recognition of gain relative to loss, or counter-
conservatism. Following this intuition, we adjust the original CR ratio definition by using the product of a negative ratio times the 
original CR ratio, and denote the measure as CC_CR. Therefore, in our study, a negative CC_CR represents a low conditional 
conservatism due to either a lower degree of asymmetric timeliness in the recognition of loss relative to gain in firms with 
adverse earnings news, or a higher degree of counter-conservatism, e.g., asymmetric timeliness in the recognition of gain relative 
to loss in firms with good earnings news. 
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          BRt = α0 + γ1CONt-1 + β1BRt-1 + β2BRt-2 + Controlst + et                                                                         (2)  
where BR refers to the bankruptcy risk measure EDF, Campbell, or Zscore; CON refers to 
unconditional and conditional conservatism measures, that is, UC_PCA, UC_AVG, CC_PCA and 
CC_AVG; and Controls refers to the control variables that are known to affect bankruptcy risk 
(Anderson et al. 1996; Shumway 2001; Parker et al. 2002; Uhrig-Homburg 2005; Campbell et al. 
2008; Eberhart et al. 2008).14 We include one- and two-period lagged bankruptcy risk measures, 
BRt-1 and BRt-2, as additional controls to account for stickiness in the autoregressive process of 
bankruptcy risk (Duffie et al. 2007). BRt-2 also controls for reverse causality from bankruptcy 
risk to unconditional and conditional conservatism. H1 translates into γ1 < 0. 
IV. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 reports summary statistics for all variables used in the empirical analyses in Panel 
A and correlation matrix for the main testing variables in Panel B. As shown in Panel A, the 
mean of conditional bankruptcy risk measure EDF is 0.0365, close to its value of 0.0420 
reported by Vassalou and Xing (2004). The mean of UC_ACC, 0.0012, is lower than those 
reported in Ahmed et al. (2002), Ahmed and Duellman (2007), but higher than those reported in 
Iliev (2010). The difference is likely due to different samples, different sample periods, and 
different accrual-based measures used in these studies.15 The mean of CC_CR, -0.3102, is lower 
than that of CR ratio reported in Callen et al. (2010), possibly because our CR ratio measure is 
not comparable to that in Callen et al. (2010), as detailed above. 
                                                 
14 Specifically, these controls include the firm size Ln(MV)t, leverage ratio Leveraget, return on total assets ROAt, return volatility 
STD_Rett, risk-free rate Rate, R&D investment intensity Inten_RDt, dummies for the Fama and French (1997) industry 
classification Ind_Dum, and indicator for the year effect Year_Dum. Consistent with prior studies, we predict that bankruptcy risk 
is positively associated with leverage and return volatility and negatively associated with ROA, Ln(MV), Rate, and Inten_RD. 
15 Ahmed et al. (2002) and Ahmed and Duellman (2007) use S&P 500 firms during 1993–1998 and 1998–2002, respectively, 
although they use the same definition with our study. Different from our study, Iliev (2010) uses asset-deflated accrual measure 
for conservatism, and sample firms with a public float around $75 million, and a sample period of 2002-2005.  
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Panel B reports Pearson and Spearman correlations for the main testing and control 
variables in the upper and lower triangles, respectively. The Spearman (Pearson) correlations 
between the main bankruptcy risk metric, EDF and Campbell, and other bankruptcy risk 
measures, including the Zscore and real bankruptcy indicator BANK, are all significantly positive, 
with Spearman (Pearson) correlations between EDF and Campbell as high as 0.7789 (0.7789). 
These results suggest that our bankruptcy risk measures have strong convergent validity. 
Correlations between the unconditional conservatism measures UC_PCA and UC_AVG are 
above 0.9990, and their correlations with component unconditional conservatism metrics 
(UC_ACC, UC_BM, and UC_RES) are uniformly positive when statistically significant. The 
evidence suggests that UC_PCA and UC_AVG possess content validity and convergent validity 
to represent unconditional conservatism. 16  UC_PCA and UC_AVG are both significantly 
negatively associated with conditional conservatism measures, CC_PCA and CC_AVG, with a 
Spearman (Pearson) correlation between UC_PCA and CC_PCA of -0.1441 (-0.0637). 
Correlations between CC_PCA and CC_ AVG are above 0.9890, and their correlations with 
component conditional conservatism metrics (CC_ACM, CC_AR, and CC_CR) are likewise 
uniformly positive when statistically significant. These correlations imply that CC_PCA and 
CC_ AVG possess content validity and convergent validity as proxies for conditional 
conservatism. Except for CC_ACM, the Spearman correlations between component measures of 
both types of conservatism are also predominantly negative, consistent with prior evidence 
(Roychowdhury and Watts 2007; Ball et al. 2013). 
Pearson and Spearman correlations of unconditional conservatism measures, UC_PCA and 
                                                 
16 A measure possesses convergent validity when it is positively correlated with another measure of the same concept. However, 
alternative measures can have low or even negative correlations if they reflect different aspects of a concept. For example, when 
measuring unconditional conservatism using hidden reserves (UC_RES) and an accrual-based measure (UC_ACC), UC_ACC and 
UC_RES are negatively correlated, possibly because firms that can use accruals to increase unconditional conservatism may have 
lower incentives to use reserves to do so. 
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UC_AVG, and their component metrics with all bankruptcy risk measures (EDF, Campbell, 
Zscore, and BANK) are significantly negative. In contrast, correlations of conditional 
conservatism measures, UC_PCA and UC_AVG, and their component metrics with all 
bankruptcy risk measures are significantly positive except for CC_ACM. However, these results 
should be interpreted cautiously, because they are subject to biases caused by the omitted 
correlated variables. Below we therefore perform multivariate analyses to examine their relations. 
Relations between Unconditional and Conditional Conservatism and Bankruptcy Risk 
We first examine relations between unconditional and conditional conservatism and 
conditional bankruptcy risk proxied by EDF, using the lagged OLS model described in Eq. (2), 
and report the results in Table 2. Models 1 to 3 indicate that lagged unconditional and 
conditional conservatism measures calculated based on the first factors of PCA analyses, 
UC_PCAt-1 and CC_PCAt-1, are both significantly negatively associated with the subsequent 
conditional bankruptcy risk measure EDFt, irrespective of whether they enter the regressions 
independently or simultaneously. In Model 3, the coefficients (t-statistics) of UC_PCAt-1 and 
CC_PCAt-1 are -0.0443 (-5.31) and -0.0083 (-12.41), respectively. The economic meaning is that 
a one standard deviation increase in UC_PCAt-1 (CC_PCAt-1), which is 0.2120 (1.6979), leads to 
a 93.92 (140.93) basis point decrease in subsequent bankruptcy risk. This evidence strongly 
supports H1 that unconditional and conditional conservatism are negatively associated with 
subsequent bankruptcy risk through their cushioning role and the informational role. Models 4 to 
6 report results for the alternative unconditional and conditional conservatism measures 
UC_AVGt-1 and CC_AVGt-1, which are calculated based on the mean of their component 
measures, respectively. UC_AVGt-1 and CC_AVGt-1 are both significantly negatively associated 
with EDFt, with their coefficients (t-statistics) in Models 5 and 6 being -0.0836 (-8.19) and -
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0.264 (-17.97), respectively. The evidence lends further support to H1. In all models, the results 
for control variables are generally consistent with expectations. For example, Leveraget and 
STD_Rett are positively associated with EDFt, whereas ROAt, Ln(MV)t, Ratet, and Inten_RDt are 
negatively associated with EDFt.17 
Because a large portion of our sample is healthy firms whose bankruptcy risk not 
necessarily depends on distress, we next examine relations between unconditional and 
conditional conservatism and unconditional bankruptcy risk proxied by Campbell using Eq. (2). 
Table 3 reports the estimation results. Models 1 to 3 of Table 3 indicate that lagged 
unconditional and conditional conservatism measures, UC_PCAt-1 and CC_PCAt-1, are both 
significantly negatively associated with subsequent unconditional bankruptcy risk measure 
Campbellt, respectively. Models 4 to 6 report that alternative unconditional and conditional 
conservatism measures UC_AVGt-1 and CC_AVGt-1 are both significantly negatively associated 
with Campbellt. Therefore, findings reported in Table 3 about unconditional bankruptcy risk, 
combined with results in Table 2 about conditional bankruptcy risk, provide further support to 
H1. In all models, the results for control variables are generally consistent with our expectations, 
and with the results in Table 2 for conditional bankruptcy risk. For example, Leveraget and 
STD_Rett are positively associated, whereas Ln(MV)t, ROAt, Ratet and Inten_RDt are negatively 
associated with Campbellt.18 
                                                 
17 Untabulated correlation analysis indicates that some control variables (e.g., Ln(MV), ROA, Leverage, STD_Ret, and Inten_RD) 
are highly correlated with bankruptcy and conservatism measures, with the magnitude of their correlations varying between 0 and 
0.60. This begs the question of whether our estimation results are influenced by multicollinearity issues. We therefore perform a 
series of multicollinearity checks on them and find that their conditional indexes are between 2.91 to 2.96 and all are lower than 
10.00, the threshold value of the conditional index indicating that multicollinearity problems affect the regression estimates 
(Belsley et al. 1980). We also find that their inflation factors (VIFs) range from 1.00 to 1.80, where VIF values larger than 10.00 
are indicators for multicollinearity issues. Thus, these results collectively suggest that multicollinearity does not qualitatively bias 
our results. 
18 Again, we perform a series of multicollinearity checks for our control variables (e.g., Ln(MV), ROA, Leverage, STD_Ret, and 
Inten_RD)  and find that their conditional indexes are between 1.00 to 2.98 and are lower than 10.00, and that the VIFs range 
from 1.00 to 2.47. These results collectively suggest that multicollinearity does not qualitatively bias our results. 
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Channels for Associations between Accounting Conservatism and Bankruptcy Risk 
To test hypotheses that unconditional and conditional conservatism influence bankruptcy 
risk by enhancing corporate cash holdings (H2a) or by constraining earnings management (H2b), 
we estimate the models below: 
Channelt = α10+ γ11UC_PCAt-1 + δ11CC_PCAt-1 + β11BRt-1 + θ11Channelt-1 + Controls1+ε11   (3) 
BRt  = α20 + θ21Channelt + γ21UC_PCAt-1 + δ21CC_PCAt-1 + β21BRt-1 + β22BRt-2                (4) 
                  + Controls2+ £21  
where BR refers to EDF or Campbell, and Channel refers to Cash or Emgmt. The measure of 
cash enhancement Cash is the ratio of changes in cash holdings and short-term investments to 
total assets. The earnings management measure Emgmtt is the factor score generated in terms of 
the first factor from a PCA of four earnings management metrics: Accrual management, cash 
flow management, discretionary expense management, and product cost management. Controls1 
differs from Controls in Eq. (2) in terms of Cash or Emgmt, whereas Controls2 is the same as 
Controls in Eq. (2).19 This model follows the intuition of Baron and Kenney (1986) for testing 
the mediating effect of a channel. H2a predicts γ11 > 0 and δ11 > 0 in Eq. (3) and θ21 < 0 in Eq. (4). 
H2b predicts γ11 < 0 and δ11 < 0 in Eq. (3) and θ21 > 0 in Eq. (4). We use seemingly unrelated 
regression (SUR) approach to estimate Eqs. (3) and (4) to account for potential cross-equational 
covariance of the error terms.   
Table 4 reports results for testing whether cash enhancing and earnings management 
                                                 
19 As shown in Table 4, when Channel is the cash-enhancing measure Cash, Controls1 includes identified determinants of cash 
holdings in the literature such as the firm size Ln(MV)t, the leverage ratio Leveraget, return on total assets ROAt, return volatility 
STD_Rett, risk-free rate Ratet, R&D investment intensity Inten_RDt, capital investment intensity Invest_capxt, debt financing 
Dissuet, cash dividends DIVt, loss dummy LOSSt, and industry and year dummies Ind_Dum and Year_Dum, respectively. When 
Channel is the earnings management measure Emgmt, Controls1 includes determinants of earnings management documented in 
previous studies (Barth et al. 2008; Cohen et al. 2008), such as the Leveraget, ROAt, Ln(MV)t, sales growth Growtht, small loss 
indicator SPOSt, sales turnover Turnt, debt financing Dissuet, equity financing Eissuet, and industry and year  dummies Ind_Dum 
and Year_Dum, respectively. 
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constraining work as channels for the relations between conservatism and conditional bankruptcy 
risk. Model 1 indicates that both lagged unconditional and conditional conservatism measures 
UC_PCAt-1 and CC_PCAt-1 are significantly and positively associated with the subsequent cash 
enhancing measure Casht, with coefficients (t-statistics) of 0.0083 (3.54) and 0.0006 (2.61), 
respectively. These results are economically significant as well in that a one standard deviation 
increase in UC_PCAt-1 (CC_PCAt-1), which is 0.2120 (1.6979), increases the future Casht by 
17.60 (10.19) basis points. In Model 2, the cash enhancing measure Casht is significantly 
negatively associated with the subsequent conditional bankruptcy risk measure EDFt, with a 
coefficient (t-statistic) of -0.0906 (-6.29). The economic meaning is that a one standard deviation 
increase in Casht, which is 0.0659, results in a 59.71 basis point decrease in EDFt. Combined, 
the results reported in Models 1 and 2 are consistent with H2a and indicate that both 
unconditional and conditional conservatism reduce conditional bankruptcy risk by enhancing 
cash holdings. Model 2 further reports that after controlling for Casht, the coefficients on lagged 
unconditional and conditional conservatism remain significantly negative, suggesting that cash 
enhancement is not the only channel for conservatism to decrease bankruptcy risk. Results for 
control variables are consistent with expectations.20 
Models 3 and 4 in Table 4 report the results for testing H2b regarding the influence of 
unconditional and conditional conservatism on subsequent conditional bankruptcy risk via 
constraining opportunistic earnings management. In Model 3, UC_PCAt-1 and CC_PCAt-1 are 
significantly negatively associated with the subsequent earnings management Emgmtt, with 
coefficients (t-statistics) of -0.0610 (-10.26) and -0.0017 (-2.57), respectively. These results are  
                                                 
20 In addition, the conditional bankruptcy risk measure EDFt-1 is significantly positively associated with Casht in Model 1, with a 
coefficient (t-statistic) of 0.0015 (1.73), indicating that with increased distress risk, firms tend to hold more cash to alleviate the 
negative effects of cash shortage on firm operations and investments. We also alternatively measure cash enhancement as the 
ratio of changes in cash and short-term investments to cash and short-term investments at the fiscal year-start, with results 
qualitatively unchanged. 
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economically significant as well in that a one standard deviation increase in UC_PCAt-1 
(CC_PCAt-1) could constrain Emgmtt by 13.57 (28.86) basis points. In Model 4, Emgmtt is 
significantly positively associated with EDFt, with a coefficient (t-statistic) of 0.0512 (13.78), 
implying that a one standard deviation increase in Emgmtt, which is 0.2575, produces a 131.84 
basis point increase in EDFt. These results lend strong support to H2b, suggesting that 
unconditional and conditional conservatism reduce conditional bankruptcy risk by constraining 
opportunistic earnings management. Reconfirming previous results, Model 4 shows that both 
types of conservatism mitigate conditional bankruptcy risk after controlling for the earnings 
management effects on EDF, suggesting that the earnings management is not the only channel 
for their relation.21 
Overall, results in Table 4 provide strong support to H2a and H2b for bankruptcy risk 
conditional on financial distress. However, a large portion of our sample includes healthy firms 
whose bankruptcy is not necessarily associated with distress. Therefore, we now perform channel 
analysis to test H2a and H2b for bankruptcy risk unconditional on distress. Table 5 reports the 
results and Model 1 indicates that both unconditional and conditional conservatism measures 
UC_PCAt-1 and CC_PCAt-1 are significantly and positively associated with the subsequent cash 
enhancing measure Casht. This result is economically significant as well: A one standard 
deviation increase in UC_PCAt-1 (CC_PCAt-1), which is 0.2120 (1.6979), increases the future 
Casht by 18.44 (8.19) basis points. In Model 2, the cash-enhancing measure Casht is significantly 
                                                 
21 As a side note, Model 3 shows that EDFt-1 is significantly negatively associated with subsequent Emgmtt, suggesting that, with 
increased bankruptcy risk, the disincentives of debtholders and other stakeholders for earnings management increasingly 
dominate managerial incentives for earnings management. Table 4 also reveals that leverage increases Emgmtt but ROAt 
decreases Emgmtt, consistent with prior evidence that distress increases earnings management and fraudulent reporting (Rosner 
2003). SPOSt, Eissuet, and Dissuet are significantly and positively associated with Emgmtt, consistent with the notion that loss 
avoidance, debt issue, and equity issue create incentives for earnings management. We also use an alternative measure for 
earnings management, calculated as the average of the four earnings management metrics of Emgmtt, with results qualitatively 
unchanged.  
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negatively associated with the unconditional bankruptcy risk measure Campbellt. The economic 
meaning is that a one standard deviation increase in Casht, which is 0.0659, results in a 39.93 
basis point decrease in Campbellt. Combined, the above results indicate that both unconditional 
and conditional conservatism reduce unconditional bankruptcy risk by enhancing cash holdings, 
thus strongly corroborating H2a. Model 2 further reports that coefficients on UC_PCAt-1 and 
CC_PCAt-1 per se remain significantly negative, suggesting that conservatism decreases 
bankruptcy risk also through other channels. Results for control variables are consistent with 
expectations.22 
Models 3 and 4 of Table 5 report the results for testing H2b that earnings management 
operates as a channel for conservatism to reduce unconditional bankruptcy risk. As shown in 
Model 3, UC_PCAt-1 and CC_PCAt-1 are negatively associated with earnings management 
Emgmtt, and the relation is both statistically and economically significant. In Model 4, Emgmtt is 
positively associated with Campbellt, and the relation is both statistically and economically 
significant in that a one standard deviation increase in Emgmtt, which is 0.2575, produces a 
100.94 basis point increase in Campbellt. These results lend strong support to H2b, suggesting 
that unconditional and conditional conservatism mitigate unconditional bankruptcy risk by 
constraining earnings management. Model 4 also shows that both types of conservatism still 
mitigate subsequent unconditional bankruptcy risk after controlling for earnings management, 
implying that conservative accounting also influences bankruptcy risk via other channels.23 
                                                 
22 The unconditional bankruptcy risk measure Campbellt-1 is significantly positively associated with Casht in Model 1, indicating 
that with an increase in bankruptcy risk, firms hold more cash to alleviate the negative effect of cash shortage on firm operations 
and investments. When we use the ratio of changes in cash and short-term investments to cash and short-term investments at the 
fiscal year-start to measure cash enhancement, the results are qualitatively unchanged. 
23  Model 3 shows that Campbellt-1 is significantly negatively associated with subsequent earnings management Emgmtt, 
suggesting that, with increased bankruptcy risk, the disincentives of debtholders and other stakeholders for earnings management 
increasingly dominate managerial incentives for earnings management. Table 5 also reveals that leverage increases Emgmtt but 
ROAt decreases Emgmtt, consistent with prior evidence that distress increases earnings management and fraudulent reporting 
(Rosner 2003). SPOSt, Eissuet, and Dissuet are significantly and positively associated with Emgmtt, consistent with the notion that 
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Income Smoothing and Relations between Conservatism and Bankruptcy Risk 
Income smoothing can be considered a type of “conservatism gaming,” whereby managers 
apply higher conservatism during good times to accumulate reserves and cushions for future 
downturns, and release these reserves and cushions during bad times. Previous studies suggest a 
negative relation between income smoothing and bankruptcy risk. Smith and Stulz (1985) argue 
that smoothing hedges against bankruptcy risk; Trueman and Titman (1988) concur that 
smoothing lowers claimholders’ perceptions of bankruptcy risk by lowering earnings volatility. 
Thus, if income smoothing increases “conservatism gaming,” it may account for the observed 
negative relations between conservatism and bankruptcy risk. We employ the SUR equations 
below to address this confounding effect: 
Esmootht = α10 + γ11UC_PCAt-1 + δ11CC_PCAt-1 + β11BRt-1 + θ11Esmootht-1 + Controls5 + ε21 (5) 
BRt  = α20 + γ21UC_PCAt-1 + δ21CC_PCAt-1 + θ21Esmootht-1 + β21BRt-1 + β22BRt-2            (6) 
+ Controls6 + ε21 
where BR refers to EDF. Esmooth refers to either inert smoothing Esmooth_Inn, which is mainly 
driven by the natural role of accruals in removing inherent cash flow shocks, or discretionary 
smoothing Esmooth_Dis, which is mainly attributable to managerial discretion (LaFond et al. 
2007). Esmooth_Inn is calculated as the decile ranking of negative one times the Spearman 
correlation between accruals and cash flow, and Esmooth_Dis is negative one times the ratio of 
the standard deviation of accruals to that of cash flow. Controls5 in Eq. (5) includes previously 
identified determinants of income smoothing and Controls6 in Eq. (6) is the same as in Eq. (2).24  
Table 6 reports results and reveals that the effect of accounting conservatism on mitigating 
                                                                                                                                                             
loss avoidance, debt issue, and equity issue create incentives for earnings management. We also use an alternative measure for 
earnings management calculated as the average of the four component earnings management metrics of Emgmtt, with results 
qualitatively unchanged.  
24 Controls5 includes the firm size Ln(MV)t, return over assets ROAt, ROA volatility Volatility_ROAt, the leverage ratio Leveraget, 
and industry and year dummies Ind_Dum and Year_Dum, respectively. 
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bankruptcy risk is incremental to the effect of income smoothing. As shown in Models 1 to 4 of 
Panel A, unconditional and conditional conservatism measures, UC_PCA and CC_PCA, 
respectively, have significant and negative association with the subsequent conditional 
bankruptcy risk, even after controlling for the effects of inert smoothing and discretionary 
smoothing. As shown in Model 1 to 4 in Panel B, unconditional and conditional conservatism 
remain significantly and negatively associated with subsequent unconditional bankruptcy risk 
Campbell, even after controlling for the effects of inert smoothing and discretionary smoothing. 
The findings strongly support the argument that the negative relation between conservatism and 
bankruptcy risk is incremental over and beyond the effects of income smoothing and its relation 
with conservatism. In addition, the results in Models 1 and 3 in both panels indicate that 
accounting conservatism reduces rather than increases subsequent inert smoothing and 
discretionary smoothing, respectively, suggesting that conservatism substitutes for income 
smoothing in mitigating bankruptcy risk. Consistent with Smith and Stulz (1985) and Trueman 
and Titman (1988), Models 2 and 4 in both panels further show that income smoothing per se 
decreases subsequent bankruptcy risk. 
V. FURTHER ANALYSES AND ROBUSTNESS CHECKS 
Endogeneity Issues 
Up to now we show that unconditional and conditional conservatism are negatively 
associated with subsequent bankruptcy risk, and that this association operates via enhancing 
corporate cash holding position and constraining earnings management, among others. However, 
the observed relations may be influenced by the reverse causality from bankruptcy risk to 
conservatism and the dynamic relations between unconditional and conditional conservatism. 
This concern confines the possibility to draw a causal inference that conservatism affects 
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bankruptcy risk. To address this issue, we conduct two additional analyses: (1) Using a two-stage 
approach to isolate the portion of conservatism robust to the reverse causality from bankruptcy 
risk to conservatism, and to the dynamics of the two types of conservatism; and (2) using SOX 
enforcement as a quasi-natural experiment that signifies exogenous shocks to accounting 
conservatism at the firm level. 
Endogeniety Analysis Using a Two-Stage Approach  
We employ a two-stage approach similar to that used in Nikolaev (2010) to explore 
whether the relation between conservatism and bankruptcy risk is robust to the reverse causality 
from bankruptcy risk to conservatism, and to the dynamics between unconditional and 
conditional conservatism. Accounting conservatism may rise with bankruptcy risk because 
conservatism is natural response to risk and uncertainty embedded in firms’ business 
environments. If this effect dominates, we cannot conclude that accounting conservatism affects 
bankruptcy risk from their observed negative relation. In addition, unconditional and conditional 
conservatism tend to be negatively correlated in the short run but positively correlated in the long 
run (Roychowdhury and Watts 2007; Ball et al. 2013). Unconditional conservatism precedes and 
preempts conditional conservatism and immunizes firms from bad news shocks (Beaver and 
Ryan 2005; Qiang 2007).  
To address these endogeneity problems, we conduct two-stage regressions, following the 
intuition of Nikolaev (2010) and Beatty et al. (2008; 2012). In the first stage, we regress 
unconditional and conditional conservatism respectively on the lagged values of bankruptcy risk 
and both types of conservatism. Note that these independent variables do not exhaust the full list 
of determinants of conservatism and only aim to capture the reverse causality from bankruptcy 
risk on conservatism and endogeneity of the two types of conservatism. Therefore, the residuals 
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from the first-stage regressions are still correlated with conservatism, and represent the portions 
of conservatism unexplained and unaffected by the reverse causality and the dynamics between 
unconditional and conditional conservatism. This type of residuals can be denoted as 
“instrumental variables” (Nikolaev 2010). Then we use these residuals to represent conditional 
and unconditional conservative reporting respectively to replicate baseline analyses using Eq. (2).  
Models 1 and 2 of Table 7 report the estimation results for the second-stage regressions of 
the two-stage approach, and show that UC_PCAR and CC_PCAR, the residual portion of 
unconditional and conditional conservatism free of reverse causality and other endogeneity 
issues, respectively, remain significantly and negatively associated with subsequent bankruptcy 
risk. The results support the view that our main findings are unlikely to be driven by potential 
reverse causality and other endogeneity issues, thus enhancing a causal inference. 
SOX Enforcement as Exogenous Shocks to Accounting Conservatism  
The passage of SOX in 2002 offers a natural regulatory setting for investigating the 
direction for the relation between accounting conservatism and bankruptcy risk. SOX regulations 
are promulgated to increase financial reporting quality, and thus bring exogenous shocks to 
accounting conservatism independent of the reverse causal effect of bankruptcy risk on 
conservatism. Lobo and Zhou (2006) and Iliev (2010) report that SOX increased accounting 
conservatism in average firms and in small firms, respectively. Our untabulated analyses 
similarly show that unconditional conservatism UC_PCA increases from 0.3443 in the pre-SOX 
period to 0.3805 in the post-SOX period, with a t-statistic of 8.77. Conditional conservatism 
CC_PCA increases from 0.8055 in the pre-SOX period to 0.8582 in the post-SOX period, with a 
t-statistic of 1.60. Because SOX enactment brings positive exogenous shocks to accounting 
conservatism, the negative relation between unconditional and conditional conservatism and 
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bankruptcy risk should strengthen in the post-SOX period, ceteris parabus.  
In addition, the potential effect of SOX enactment on decreasing bankruptcy risk further 
adds to the proposed negative relation between conservatism and bankruptcy risk in the post-
SOX period. SOX enactment enhances corporate cash holdings by increasing managers’ liability 
and constraining corporate risk takings (Bargeron, Lehn, and Zutter 2010), and decreases 
information asymmetry by improving corporate transparency, both of which reduce bankruptcy 
risk. By decreasing bankruptcy risk and increases conservatism at the same time, SOX enactment 
further enhances the mitigating effect of conservatism on bankruptcy risk. 25  We use the 
following equation to test our expectation: 
BRt = α0 + γ0CONt-1*SOX + γ1CONt-1 + γ2SOX + γ3BOOM + β1BRt-1 + β2BRt-2 +                   (7)                       
          Controlst + εt     
where BR refers to EDF, or Campbell. CON refers to UC_PCAR, CC_PCAR. SOX is an indicator 
for fiscal year after 2002 and proxies for SOX enactment. BOOM is an indicator for credit boom 
periods 1994-1998 and 2004-2007 (Becker and Ivashina 2014), and it controls for the potential 
confounding effect of credit boom on accounting conservatism and on SOX enactment. Controls 
is the same as in Eq. (2) described under Table 2. Our expectation translates into γ0<0.  
Models 3 and 4 of Table 7 report estimation results and show that the interactions of SOX 
enactment and the two types of conservatism are consistently negatively associated with 
bankruptcy risk, respectively, with their coefficients significantly negative in all cases except for 
one. Unconditional and conditional conservatism remain significantly negatively linked to 
subsequent bankruptcy risk measures. The coefficients on SOX dummy per se are significantly 
negative, consistent with prediction that SOX regulation decreases bankruptcy risk. Over all, 
                                                 
25 Indeed, SOX enactment also adds real cost to firms and decreases firm values of small firms (Iliev 2010). However, we expect 
that this effect is secondary and do not hold for an average firm, and hence the mitigating effect of SOX on bankruptcy risk 
dominates.  
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analyses using the two-stage approach and using SOX enactment setting suggest that the 
observed negative relation between conservatism and bankruptcy risk is mainly attributable to 
the effect of accounting conservatism on decreasing bankruptcy risk. 
The Cases of Extreme Distress and CDS Contracting 
We now investigate whether the relation between accounting conservatism and bankruptcy 
risk still holds in the cases of extreme distress and CDS contract initiation. In distressed firms 
with high leverage, control rights progressively transfer to debtholders who demand higher 
conservatism to constrain managerial risk-taking incentives (Brockman et al. 2012). This 
strengthens the mitigating effect of conservatism on bankruptcy risk. However, in extremely 
distressed firms, managerial incentives and governance mechanisms may differ remarkably, and 
the relations between accounting conservatism and bankruptcy risk may also change. 
Specifically, in deeply distressed firms, shareholders’ implicit call options on assets are at or 
close to the money, and equity values increase with asset volatility. When shareholders’ risk-
shifting incentives increasingly dominate such that firms prefer risk taking, firms may have less 
incentive to use conservatism to mitigate bankruptcy risk. In addition, the going-concern 
assumption of accrual accounting is less likely to apply in extremely distressed firms, making 
accrual accounting and unconditional conservatism less relevant. Meanwhile, firms’ control 
rights also possibly transfer to creditors who tend to demand higher conservatism to prevent risk 
shifting to them and wealth transferring to shareholders. Constructing a subsample of the most 
distressed firms defined as those with the top decile of the leverage ratio, we re-examine the 
relations between conservatism and bankruptcy risk. 
CDS is an insurance-type contracts that offer buyers protection against possible default of a 
reference entity and could fundamentally change debt contracting relations between lenders (i.e., 
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protection buyers) and borrowers (i.e., CDS referenced firms). The reason is that when CDS 
contracts can protect lenders from credit risk, they tend to become tougher during debt 
renegotiations, thus increasing bankruptcy risk (Peristiani and Savino 2014; Subrahmanyam et al. 
2014). For the same reason, lenders have fewer incentives to engage in costly monitoring and 
demand less conservative accounting; as responses, borrowing firms apply low accounting 
conservatism (Martin and Roychowdhury 2015). By increasing bankruptcy risk and decreasing 
accounting conservatism simultaneously, CDS contact initiation may weaken or eliminate the 
negative relation between conservatism and bankruptcy risk. To explore this possibility, we 
select a subsample of CDS referenced firms after the CDS initiation stage, which covers 1,755 
observations for 453 CDS referenced firms from 2002 to 2007, to re-examine Eq. (2). 
Models 5 and 6 of Table 7 reports results for a subsample of firms with extreme distress 
proxied by the top-decile leverage ratios and demonstrate that results remain qualitatively 
unchanged from those reported in Tables 2 and 3. Specifically, both unconditional and 
conditional conservatism are significantly negatively associated with conditional and 
unconditional bankruptcy risk, respectively. These findings indicate that our baseline results still 
holds in the extreme distress scenario, wherein the debt contracting relations do not change 
qualitatively.26 In contrast, Models 7 and 8 indicate that after CDS initiations, the observed 
negative relations between conservative accounting and bankruptcy risk weaken or disappear. 
This result is consistent with expectations and possibly results from the fact that CDS contacts 
qualitatively changes the debt contracting relations in CDS referenced firms. 
Alternative Measures for Bankruptcy Risk and Accounting Conservatism 
To assess the robustness of bankruptcy risk measure, we reexamine relations between 
                                                 
26 We also use the lowest decile of ROA to proxy for extreme distress and find that the results are qualitatively unchanged.  
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conservatism and bankruptcy risk using an alternative measure for unconditional bankruptcy 
risk, Zscore. In addition, we also follow Campbell et al. (2008) and use a logit model below to 
examine relations between conservatism and bankruptcy risk for a subsample of firms with real 
bankruptcy as indicated by BANK: 
BANKt = α + γCONt-1 + Controls7t + µt                                                                                                                            (8) 
where BANK equals one if a firm actually filed for bankruptcy under Chapters 7 or 11 of the 
Bankruptcy Code during the sample period, and zero otherwise, and CON refers to the 
unconditional or conditional conservatism measures UC_PCA or CC_PCA, respectively.27  
Models 1 and 2 in Table 8 indicate that unconditional and conditional conservatism are 
significantly and negatively associated with subsequent Zscore, reconfirming the results in Table 
3. Model 2 reports the logit model results for real bankruptcy BANK and shows that only 
unconditional conservatism is significantly and negatively associated with BANK, while 
conditional conservatism is insignificantly related with BANK. Possible explanations are as 
follows. First, the cushioning role of conservative accounting plays a more important role for 
firms close to bankruptcy. Second, bad news is already disclosed for firms close to bankruptcy, 
and further disclosure is unhelpful for reducing information asymmetries between mangers and 
debtholders and could cause shocks and frictions among debt claimants and induce new 
information asymmetries, counterbalancing the mitigating influence of conditional conservatism 
on bankruptcy risk. 
To address the possibility that our results may be driven by a single component measure of 
                                                 
27  Controls7 includes the following determinants mainly used in Campbell et al. (2008): the market-based profitability 
(NIMTAVG); the predictability of the excess return relative to the S&P 500 index (EXRETAVG); the R&D investment intensity 
(Inten_RD); the firm size relative to that of the S&P 500 index (Rsize); the stock price (PRICE) and the risk-free rate (Rate), 
which are expected to reduce the probability of BANK; the leverage ratio (Leverage); the liquidity ratio (Cash); changes in the 
liquidity ratio (ΔCash); and the return volatility (STD_Ret) and the market-to-book equity ratio (MB), which are expected to 
increase the probability of BANK. 
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unconditional or conditional conservative accounting, we next examine three component 
measures of UC_PCA, namely, UC_ACC, UC_BM, and UC_RES, and three component 
measures of CC_PCA, namely, CC_ACM, CC_AR, and CC_CR. Models 3 to 14 in Table 9 
indicate that all these measures are significantly negatively associated with subsequent 
conditional bankruptcy risk except for CC_ACM, which has an insignificant coefficient.  
Alternative Estimation Models  
Finally, unconditional and conditional conservatism measures are sticky. The bankruptcy 
risk measure EDF is also sticky and follows a long-run autoregressive process (Duffie et al. 
2007). The stickiness of these measures suggests that our OLS estimation results may be 
sensitive to the lag structure of testing variables. To address this possibility, we re-examine H1 
using an OLS model that additionally controls for two additional lagged periods of unconditional 
and conditional conservative accounting and bankruptcy risk, respectively. Untabulated results 
show that this treatment does not change our results qualitatively.28 
VI. CONCLUSION 
This study examines relations between accounting conservatism and bankruptcy risk with 
two primary findings: (i) Unconditional and conditional conservatism are negatively associated 
with subsequent bankruptcy risk, and (ii) unconditional and conditional conservatism reduce 
subsequent bankruptcy risk by enhancing cash holdings and constraining earnings management, 
consistent with their cushioning role and informational role. Additional analyses reveal that these 
relations are robust to controlling for reverse causality from bankruptcy to conservatism, and 
                                                 
28 We also perform the following series of additional robustness checks: Use the original C score of Khan and Watts (2009) and 
CC_CR calculated using the direct method following Callen et al. (2010); use the negative skewness measure of Zhang (2008) to 
replace CC_AR to calculate our main conditional conservatism measure; use Qiang’s (2007) accrual-based measure to replace 
UC_ACC and the first difference of UC_RES to replace its original value, with the aim to address the possibility that UC_ACC 
and UC_RES insufficiently reflect discretionary unconditional conservatism; and use the industry-specific component of the 
book-to-market ratio to proxy for unconditional conservatism, following Qiang (2007), to address the concern that UC_BM 
captures both types of conservatism. These treatments do not qualitatively change our findings. 
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endogeneity between the two types of conservatism, SOX enactment, income smoothing, 
extreme distress and alternative measures for main testing variables. However, relations between 
conservatism and bankruptcy risk weaken or disappear in reference firms after CDS contract 
initiations.  
Our results provide several implications. They provide original evidence that conservative 
accounting, on average, mitigates bankruptcy risk in both healthy and distressed firms. We also 
document channels by which accounting conservatism influences bankruptcy risk. These results 
are of natural interest to firm stakeholders and economic policymakers by providing accounting-
based tools to mitigate firm failures and related contagions. Our findings also help explain the 
long-standing use and pervasiveness of conservative accounting. Finally, our results are of 
relevance to accounting standard setters and capital market regulators. 
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Appendix A Variable Definitions 
Bankruptcy Risk Measures 
EDF: Proxy for conditional bankruptcy risk and it is the ranking of the expected default probability one year ahead, 
estimated following Merton’s (1974) model. 
Campbell: Proxy for unconditional bankruptcy risk and it is the ranking of the probability of business failure one 
month ahead, calculated based on the formula in the last column of Table III of Campbell et al. (2008). 
Zscore: Proxy for unconditional bankruptcy risk and it is the ranking of negative one times Altman’s (1968) Z-score 
estimated as 3.3*ROA + 1.2*(net working capital/total assets) + 1.00*(sales/total assets) + 0.6*(market equity/book 
debt) + 1.4*(accumulated retained earnings/total assets). 
BANK: Proxy for realized bankruptcy risk and it is a dummy variable equal to one if a firm files for bankruptcy 
under Chapter 11 or Chapter 7 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code and zero otherwise. 
 
Unconditional Conservatism Measures 
UC_PCA: Proxy for unconditional conservatism and it is the factor score generated in terms of the first factor from a 
principal components analysis (PCA) of three component unconditional conservatism measures: UC_ACC, UC_BM, 
and UC_RES. Their eigenvalues are 0.9539, 1.1433, and 0.9028, respectively; their eigenvectors are 0.5380, 0.6342, 
and 0.6721, respectively; and their final communality estimates are 0.2894, 0.4022, and 0.4517, respectively. The 
first factor from the PCA explains a 1.0789 variance between the component measures.  
UC_AVG: A secondary proxy for unconditional conservatism and it is the average of the three component 
unconditional conservatism measures: UC_ACC, UC_BM, and UC_RES. 
UC_ACC: a component unconditional conservatism measure and it is equal to minus one times the ratio of total 
accruals to average total assets, calculated over a rolling window of the current year and prior two years. 
UC_BM: A component unconditional conservatism measure and it is the ranking of minus one times the industry-
adjusted ratio of book to market value of common shareholders’ equity at the fiscal year-end. 
UC_RES: a component unconditional conservatism measure and it is the ratio of LIFO reserves plus hidden R&D 
and advertising reserves to total assets. 
 
Conditional Conservatism Measures 
CC_PCA: Proxy for conditional conservatism and it is the factor score generated in terms of the first factor from a 
PCA of the three component conditional conservatism measures: CC_ACM, CC_AR, and CC_CR. Their eigenvalues 
are 1.0461, 1.0324, and 0.9214, respectively; their eigenvectors are 0.3176, 0.5468, and 0.8040, respectively; and 
their final communality estimates are 0.1008, 0.2990, and 0.6464, respectively. The first factor from the PCA 
explains a 1.0461 variance between the component measures.  
CC_AVG: A secondary proxy for conditional conservatism and it is the average of the three component conditional 
conservatism measures: CC_ACM, CC_AR, and CC_CR. 
CC_ACM: A component conditional conservatism measure and it is minus one times the ratio of accumulated non-
operating accruals to accumulated total assets, calculated over a rolling window of the current year and the prior two 
years. 
CC_AR: A component conditional conservatism measure and it is the ratio of the C score plus the G score to the G 
score, as defined by Khan and Watts (2009), calculated using the formula in Table 3 of Khan and Watts (2009). 
CC_CR: A component conditional conservatism measure and it is the ratio of the unexpected current earnings (or 
current earnings shocks) to total earnings news, with the ratio multiplied by minus one if earnings news is positive. 
 
Measures for Other Testing Variables and Conditioning Variables 
Cash: The ratio of changes in cash holdings and short-term investments to total assets. 
Emgmt: proxy for earnings management and it is measured as the factor score generated in terms of the first factor 
from a PCA of the four earnings management metrics: the ranking of the absolute value of the discretionary accrual 
DA, abnormal operating cash flow R_OCF, abnormal discretionary expenses R_DISX, and abnormal product cost 
R_PROD. Their eigenvalues are 1.2992, 1.1747, 0.8823, and 0.6438, respectively; their eigenvectors are 0.2138, -
0.7195, 0.8136, and -0.2691, respectively; and their final communality estimates are 0.0473, 0.5177, 0.6619, and 
0.0724, respectively. 
Leverage: The ratio of the sum of long-term and short-term debts to total assets. 
Esmooth_Inn: Proxy for inert income smoothing and it is measured as the decile ranking of negative one times the 
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Spearman correlation of the operating cash flow and accruals (both deflated by total assets), estimated over a rolling 
window of five fiscal years. 
Esmooth_Dis: Proxy for discretionary income smoothing and it is measured as negative one times the ratio of the 
standard deviation of earnings to that of operating cash flows (both deflated by total assets), estimated over a rolling 
window of five fiscal years. 
SOX: An indicator for fiscal year after 2002 and proxies for SOX enactment.  
 
Control Variables 
Ln(MV): The natural logarithm of the market capitalization at the fiscal year end. 
ROA: The ratio of earnings over total assets. 
STD_Ret: The annualized standard deviation of the daily stock return over the prior twelve months. 
Rate: the risk-free rate measured by the annualized three-month T-bill rate retrieved from the Federal Reserve Bank 
Reports. 
Inten_RD: The ratio of R&D expenses to total assets. 
Volatility_ROA: The variance of ROA calculated over a rolling window of the current year and prior four years. 
SPOS: An indicator for small positive earnings, equal to one if net income scaled by total assets is between 0 and 
0.01 and zero otherwise, following Barth et al. (2008). 
Turn: The sales divided by end-of-year total assets, following Barth et al. (2008). 
Eissue: The ratio of the changes in common shares outstanding at the current and previous fiscal year-ends to those 
at the previous fiscal year-end. 
Dissue: The ratio of annual change in total liabilities to beginning-of-year total liabilities, following Barth et al. 
(2008). 
DIV: The ratio of cash dividends to total assets. 
Invest_CAPX: the ratio of capital expenditures to total assets. 
LOSS: A dummy variable equal to one if a firm has a negative income for the current fiscal year, and zero otherwise. 
Growth: Proxy for growth rate and it is measured as the annual change in sales deflated by sales in the previous 
fiscal year. 
BOOM: An indicator for credit boom periods 1994-1998 and 2004-2007. 
Exretavg: Proxy for the return predictability of EXRET (past excess return relative to the value-weighted S&P 500 
index return over a period of 12 months) and calculated as Exretavgt-1,t-12 = , 
where EXRETit = log(1+Rit) - log(1 + RS&P500,t) and φ = ½. 
MB: The ratio of the market-to-book value of equity. 
Nimtaavg: Proxy for earnings predictability. Assuming earnings degenerate at the monthly rate φ = ½, it is the 
present value of the three-year sum of NIMTA, the annual net income deflated by total liabilities and the market 
value of equity: Nimtaavgt-1,t-4 = . 
Price: The stock price at the fiscal year-end calculated as the natural logarithm of the price per share. 
Rsize: Proxy for relative firm size and it is calculated as the natural logarithm of the market value of equity relative 
to that of the S&P 500 index. 
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Table 1 Descriptive Statistics 
 
This table reports descriptive statistics for the full sample from fiscal years 1989 through 2007. Panel A presents summary 
statistics for all of the variables used in the empirical analyses, and Panel B presents pairwise correlations between the main 
testing variables, with the upper (lower) triangle displaying Pearson (Spearman) correlations, with highlighted figures 
indicating statistical significance at least at the 90% confidence level. Variable definitions are provided in Appendix A. 
 
Panel A: Summary Statistics for All Variables Used in the Empirical Analyses
Variable Mean Q1 Median Q3 
EDF (Raw, %) 3.6502 0.0000 0.0000 0.0558 
Campbell (Raw, %) 0.0127 0.0014 0.0028 0.0064 
Zscore (Raw) -3.5093 -4.3556 -2.8542 -1.7630 
UC_PCA 0.3659 0.1897 0.3639 0.5319 
UC_AVG 0.1908 0.0985 0.1897 0.2785 
UC_ACC -0.0012 -0.0218 0.0010 0.0209 
UC_BM (Raw) -1.9489 -2.2175 -1.3437 -0.8280 
UC_RES 0.0729 0.0000 0.0190 0.0910 
CC_PCA 0.9188 0.4394 0.9534 1.5941 
CC_AVG 0.6114 0.3185 0.3185 0.9620 
CC_ACM 0.0189 0.0004 0.0156 0.0355 
CC_AR 2.1255 1.2598 1.9177 2.8431 
CC_CR -0.3102 -0.4259 -0.1237 0.1165 
Cash 0.0061 -0.0103 0.0015 0.0217 
Emgmt -0.2631 -0.4550 -0.2735 -0.0771 
Esmooth _Inn 0.6048 0.4000 0.7000 0.9000 
Esmooth _Dis -1.1206 -1.2771 -0.7562 -0.4494 
ln(MV) 5.8566 4.3320 5.8492 7.3159 
Leverage 0.2540 0.1290 0.2478 0.3622 
ROA 0.0336 0.0141 0.0420 0.0728 
STD_Ret  0.4833 0.2939 0.4226 0.6119 
Rate 0.0418 0.0287 0.0460 0.0516 
Inten_RD 0.1261 0.0054 0.0219 0.0612 
Inten_CAPX 0.0704 0.0271 0.0491 0.0857 
Volatility_ROA 0.0054 0.0002 0.0006 0.0023 
Turn 1.1700 0.6405 1.0352 1.4803 
Eissue 0.0530 0.0000 0.0000 0.0050 
Dissue 0.2137 -0.0457 0.0566 0.2225 
DIV 0.0122 0.0000 0.0043 0.0173 
Growth 0.2649 0.0051 0.0858 0.1955 
Exretavg  -0.0031 -0.0244 0.0002 0.0226 
MB 0.9042 0.4510 0.7442 1.2077 
Nimtaavg 0.0305 0.0101 0.0311 0.0476 
Price 2.3341 2.1401 2.7081 2.7081 
Rsize  -10.0948 -11.5031 -10.0096 -8.6159 
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Table 1 Descriptive Statistics (Cont’d) 
 
Panel B: Correlation Matrix for the Main Variables 
Variable 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 
1. EDF 1 0.7789 0.2441 0.0124 -0.1948 -0.2062 -0.0333 -0.23 -0.0138 0.2404 0.3 -0.0023 0.488 0.0671 
2. Campbell 0.7789 1 0.6458 0.0156 -0.059 -0.0584 0.0334 -0.2136 -0.0025 0.2468 0.1444 -0.0081 0.4764 0.0788 
3. Zscore  0.4185 0.1133 1 0.0196 -0.0737 -0.0968 -0.1687 -0.0419 -0.0838 0.0711 0.0962 -0.0253 0.0578 0.0549 
4. BANK 0.0265 0.0384 0.0241 1 -0.0287 -0.0291 -0.0222 -0.0256 -0.0096 0.0168 0.0172 -0.0103 0.0407 -0.0035 
5. UC_PCA -0.2168 -0.217 -0.0725 -0.0299 1 0.9999 0.182 0.9025 0.4861 -0.0637 -0.0898 0.1237 -0.202 0.0104 
6. UC_AVG -0.2174 -0.2151 -0.0488 -0.0301 0.9996 1 0.2033 0.9081 0.4672 -0.0651 -0.0917 0.1134 -0.2062 0.014 
7. UC_ACC -0.0274 0.0397 0.1753 -0.0158 0.1611 0.1803 1 0.0517 0.0489 0.0029 -0.0039 0.4819 -0.0728 0.0284 
8. UC_BM -0.2303 -0.2139 -0.0427 -0.0256 0.9349 0.9369 0.0574 1 0.0808 -0.0964 -0.1282 0.0516 -0.2485 -0.0061 
9. UC_RES -0.0474 -0.1398 -0.315 -0.0078 0.3023 0.2891 -0.039 0.0411 1 0.0468 0.0521 0.0551 0.0514 0.0301 
10. CC_PCA 0.4111 0.4095 0.102 0.0318 -0.1441 -0.1454 -0.0243 -0.1704 -0.0028 1 0.9893 -0.0062 0.716 0.685 
11. CC_AVG 0.4286 0.4213 0.154 0.0339 -0.1563 -0.1578 -0.0305 -0.1844 -0.0024 0.9901 1 0.028 0.534 0.8973 
12. CC_ACM -0.0204 -0.0454 -0.0596 -0.0089 0.1057 0.1139 0.4483 0.0485 0.0391 0.0262 -0.0026 1 -0.0425 0.0375 
13. CC_AR 0.4655 0.4335 0.0362 0.0407 -0.2084 -0.2112 -0.0901 -0.2359 -0.006 0.4056 0.7855 -0.0591 1 0.0426 
14. CC_CR 0.1922 0.2145 0.0549 0.008 -0.0299 -0.0295 0.0336 -0.0426 -0.0043 0.9305 0.5972 0.0245 0.1167 1 
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Table 2 Relations between Accounting Conservatism and Conditional Bankruptcy Risk 
 
This table reports the OLS estimation results for testing relations between unconditional and conditional conservatism and the 
subsequent conditional bankruptcy risk using the full sample. The conditional bankruptcy risk measure is EDF, the unconditional 
conservatism measures are UC_PCA and UC_AVG, and the conditional conservatism measures are CC_PCA and CC_AVG, 
respectively. The t-statistics are adjusted for firm-level clusters, model details are provided at the end of the table, and variable 
definitions are available in Appendix A. *, **, and *** indicate that a coefficient is significant at the 90%, 95%, and 99% 
confidence level, respectively. 
 
Independent Variables 
 Dependent Variable: EDF 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Intercept 0.3349 0.3366 0.3473 0.3328 0.3496 0.3600  
 (14.93)*** (15.10)*** (15.57)*** (15.34)*** (16.19)*** (16.68)*** 
UC_PCAt-1 -0.0471  -0.0443    
 (-5.54)***  (-5.31)***    
UC_AVGt-1    -0.0911  -0.0836 
    (-8.85)***  (-8.19)*** 
CC_ PCAt-1  -0.0085 -0.0083    
  (-12.54)*** (-12.41)***    
CC_ AVGt-2     -0.0268 -0.0264
     (-18.19)*** (-17.97)***
EDFt-1 0.2215 0.2354 0.2290 0.2202 0.2383 0.2319 
 (31.71)*** (32.13)*** (32.27)*** (42.38)*** (45.61)*** (44.44)*** 
EDFt-2 0.0311 0.0309 0.0308 0.0310 0.0316 0.0317 
 (6.43)*** (6.41)*** (6.43)*** (7.12)*** (7.31)*** (7.32)*** 
Ln(MV)t -0.036 -0.0385 -0.0376 -0.0361 -0.0401 -0.0392 
 (-35.22)*** (-37.90)*** (-36.74)*** (-57.06)*** (-62.76)*** (-60.22)*** 
Leveraget 0.6433 0.6405 0.6425 0.6426 0.6500 0.6521 
 (56.06)*** (56.12)*** (56.66)*** (90.85)*** (91.15)*** (91.54)*** 
ROAt -0.4313 -0.436 -0.4379 -0.4306 -0.4346 -0.4364 
 (-23.96)*** (-24.13)*** (-24.55)*** (-30.93)*** (-31.19)*** (-31.43)*** 
STD_Rett 0.3044 0.3034 0.3074 0.3050 0.3058 0.3097 
 (39.01)*** (38.92)*** (40.32)*** (58.44)*** (59.37)*** (59.75)*** 
Ratet -1.1669 -1.1835 -1.1803 -0.1571 -1.1883 -1.1848 
 (-4.88)*** (-4.97)*** (-4.95)*** (-4.62)*** (-4.78)*** (-4.77)*** 
Inten_RDt -0.0006 -0.0006 -0.0005 -0.0006 -0.0006 -0.0005 
 (-0.85) (-0.86) (-0.83) (-0.85) (-0.87) (-0.83) 
Year and Ind. Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm-level clusters Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sample size 34,896 34,896 34,896 34,896 34,896 34,896 
R2 0.6784 0.6798 0.6805 0.6792 0.6824 0.6831 
The OLS model used in this table for Models 1 to 6 is as follows: 
BRt = α10 + γ11CONt-1 + β11BRt-1 + β12BRt-2 + Controls + εt                                                                                                                                              (2) 
where BR = EDF, and CON = UC_PCA, UC_AVG, CC_PCA or CC_AVG in all models. Controls include the firm size Ln(MV)t, the 
leverage ratio Leveraget, return on assets ROAt, return volatility STD_Rett, risk-free rate Ratet, R&D investment intensity 
Inten_RDt, and industry and year dummies Ind_Dum and Year_Dum, respectively. 
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Table 3 Relations between Accounting Conservatism and Unconditional Bankruptcy Risk 
 
This table reports the OLS estimation results for testing relations between unconditional and conditional conservatism and the 
subsequent unconditional bankruptcy risk over the full sample. The unconditional bankruptcy risk measure is Campbell, the 
unconditional conservatism measures are UC_PCA and UC_AVG, and the conditional conservatism measures are CC_PCA and 
CC_AVG, respectively. The t-statistics are adjusted for firm-level clusters, model details are provided at the end of the table, and 
variable definitions are available in Appendix A. *, **, and *** indicate that a coefficient is significant at the 90%, 95%, and 99% 
confidence level, respectively. 
 
Independent Variables 
 Dependent Variable: Campbell 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Intercept 0.3359 0.3451 0.3521 0.3358 0.3623 0.3687 
 (14.24)*** (14.74)*** (15.01)*** (14.24)*** (15.50)*** (15.74)*** 
UC_PCAt-1 -0.0338  -0.0293    
 (-5.85)***  (-5.10)***    
UC_AVGt-1    -0.0643  -0.0531 
    (-5.83)***  (-4.86)*** 
CC_ PCAt-1  -0.0117 -0.0115    
  (-17.44)*** (-17.26)***    
CC_ AVGt-1     -0.034 -0.0336 
     (-20.83)*** (-20.67)*** 
Campbellt-1 0.3190 0.3378 0.3336 0.3190 0.3440 0.3399 
 (55.14)*** (59.46)*** (58.22)*** (55.94)*** (60.52)*** (59.28)*** 
Campbellt-2 0.0252 0.021 0.0214 0.0252 0.0212 0.0217 
 (5.24)*** (4.38)*** (4.49)*** (5.25)*** (4.44)*** (4.55)*** 
Ln(MV)t -0.0279 -0.0308 -0.0302 -0.0279 -0.0326 -0.032 
 (-44.88)*** (-49.85)*** (-47.59)*** (-44.86)*** (-51.39)*** (-49.17)*** 
Leveraget 0.5232 0.5201 0.5212 0.5233 0.5202 0.5214 
 (68.95)*** (68.94)*** (69.09)*** (68.95)*** (69.21)*** (69.35)*** 
ROAt -0.9474 -0.9493 -0.9517 -0.9473 -0.945 -0.9472 
 (-51.30)*** (-51.43)*** (-51.61)*** (-51.29)*** (-51.31)*** (-51.47)*** 
STD_Rett 0.1445 0.1465 0.1489 0.1445 0.1485 0.1508 
 (29.15)*** (29.79)*** (30.17)*** (29.15)*** (30.29)*** (30.64)*** 
Ratet -0.1356 -0.1452 -0.1456 -0.1354 -0.1585 -0.1586 
 (-0.49) (-0.53) (-0.53) (-0.49) (-0.58) (-0.58) 
Inten_RDt -0.0015 -0.0014 -0.0014 -0.0015 -0.0014 -0.0014 
 (-1.71)* (-1.69)* (-1.67)* (-1.70)* (-1.69)* (-1.67)* 
Year and Ind. Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm-level clusters Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sample size 34,886 34,886 34,886 34,886 34,896 34,896 
R2 0.6383 0.6420 0.6423 0.6383 0.6442 0.6445 
The OLS model used in this table for Models 1 to 6 is as follows: 
BRt = α10 + γ11CONt-1 + β11BRt-1 + β12BRt-2 + Controls + εt                                                                                                                                                         (2) 
where BR = Campbell, and CON = UC_PCA, UC_AVG, CC_PCA or CC_AVG in all models. Controls include the firm size 
Ln(MV)t, the leverage ratio Leveraget, return on assets ROAt, return volatility STD_Rett, risk-free rate Ratet, R&D investment 
intensity Inten_RDt, and industry and year dummies Ind_Dum and Year_Dum, respectively. 
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Table 4 Cash Enhancement and Earnings Management as Potential Channels for 
Associations between Accounting Conservatism and Conditional Bankruptcy Risk 
 
This table reports the SUR estimation results for examining the mediating effects of cash enhancement and earnings management 
on relations between unconditional and conditional conservatism and bankruptcy risk. The models for testing the cash-enhancing 
channel consist of two OLS regression models that regress changes in cash holdings Cash on lagged unconditional and 
conditional conservatism measures UC_PCA and CC_PCA and other controls in Model 1, and regress the conditional bankruptcy 
risk measure EDF on Cash, UC_PCA and CC_PCA, and other controls in Model 2, respectively. The models for testing the 
earnings management channel also consist of two SUR regression models that regress the earnings management measure Emgmt 
on the lagged UC_PCA and CC_PCA and other controls in Model 3, and regress EDF on Emgmt and other controls in Model 4, 
respectively. The t-statistics are adjusted for firm-level clusters, model details are provided below, and variable definitions are 
available in Appendix A. *, **, and *** indicate that a coefficient is significant at the 90%, 95% and 99% confidence level, 
respectively. 
 
Independent Variables 
Casht  EDFt Emgmtt EDFt 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Intercept -0.0067 0.3475 -0.1602 0.4586 
 (-2.07)** (15.74)*** (-17.18)*** (31.28)*** 
Casht  -0.0906   
  (-6.29)***   
Casht-1 -0.1791    
 (-4.89)***    
Emgmtt    0.0512 
    (13.78)***
Emgmtt-1   0.4414  
   (84.55)***  
UC_PCAt-1 0.0083 -0.0383 -0.0604 -0.0398 
 (3.54)*** (-7.01)*** (-10.02)*** (-7.40)*** 
CC_PCAt-1 0.0006 -0.0082 -0.0017 -0.0083 
 (2.61)*** (-13.69)*** (-2.63)*** (-13.91)*** 
EDFt-1 0.008 0.2407 -0.0350 0.2284 
 (4.62)*** (49.82)*** (-7.07)*** (43.77)*** 
EDFt-2  0.0748  0.0291 
  (8.22)***  (6.73)*** 
Ln(MV)t 0.0015 -0.0377 -0.0069 -0.0368 
 (6.73)*** (-58.61)*** (-9.74)*** (-57.11)*** 
Leveraget -0.0198 0.6478 0.1006 0.6474 
 (-6.06)*** (89.19)*** (11.92)*** (90.72)*** 
ROAt 0.1652 -0.4340 -0.7448 -0.3847 
 (12.37)*** (-29.84)*** (-44.03)*** (-26.86)*** 
STD_Rett -0.0009 -0.0005  0.3111 
 (-2.73)*** (-0.86)  (59.86)*** 
Ratet 0.0097 0.3089  -2.3959 
 (4.97)*** (58.05)***  (-13.93)*** 
Inten_RDt -0.1004 -0.0005  -0.0006 
 (-15.30)*** (-0.85)  (-0.87) 
Invest_capxt 0.0656    
 (9.09)***    
Dissuet -0.1823  0.0043  
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 (-5.71)***  (1.92)*  
DIVt 0.0046    
 (2.82)***    
LOSSt -0.1004    
 (-15.30)***    
Turnt   0.0602  
   (22.06)***  
Growtht   0.0000   
   (-1.43)  
SPOSt   0.0261  
   (5.56)***  
Eissuet   0.0137  
   (3.12)***  
Year and Ind. Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm-level clusters Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sample size 33,560 33,560 34,857 34,857 
R2 0.0875 0.6835 0.4038 0.6826 
The SUR regression model used in this table includes the following two equations: 
Channelt = α10 + γ11UC_PCAt-1 + δ11CC_PCAt-1 + β11BRt-1 + θ11Channelt-1 + Controls1+ ε11 (3) 
BRt = α20 + θ21Channelt+ γ21UC_PCAt-1 + δ21CC_PCAt-1 + β21BRt-1 + β21BRt-2+ Controls2 + ε21 (4) 
where BR = EDF, and Channel = Cash or Emgmt. When Channel is the cash-enhancing measure Cash, Controls1 includes the 
firm size Ln(MV)t, leverage ratio Leveraget, return on total assets ROAt, return volatility STD_Rett, risk-free rate Ratet, R&D 
investment intensity Inten_RDt, capital investment intensity Invest_capxt, annual change in total liabilities Dissuet, cash 
dividends DIVt, loss dummy LOSSt, industry dummy Ind_Dum, and fiscal year dummy Year_Dum. When Channel is the 
earnings management measure Emgmt, Controls1 includes the Leveraget, ROAt, Ln(MV)t, sales growth Growtht, small loss 
indicator SPOSt, sales turnover Turnt, debt financing Dissuet, equity financing Eissuet, industry dummy Ind_Dum, and fiscal 
year dummy Year. Controls2 is the same as Controls in Eq. (2). 
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Table 5 Cash Enhancement and Earnings Management as Potential Channels for 
Associations between Accounting Conservatism and Unconditional Bankruptcy Risk 
 
This table reports the SUR estimation results for examining the mediating effects of cash enhancement and earnings management 
on relations between unconditional and conditional conservatism and unconditional bankruptcy risk. The models for testing the 
cash-enhancing channel consist of two OLS regression models that regress changes in cash holdings Cash on the lagged 
unconditional and conditional conservatism measures UC_PCA and CC_PCA and other controls in Model 1, and regress the 
unconditional bankruptcy risk measure Campbell on Cash, UC_PCA, and CC_PCA, and other controls in Model 2, respectively. 
The models for the earnings management channel consist of two SUR regression models that regress the earnings management 
measure Emgmt on the lagged UC_PCA and CC_PCA and other controls in Model 3, and regress Campbell on Emgmt and other 
controls in Model 4, respectively. The t-statistics are adjusted for firm-level clusters, model details are provided below, and 
variable definitions are available in Appendix A. *, **, and *** indicate that a coefficient is significant at the 90%, 95%, and 
99% confidence level, respectively. 
 
Independent Variables Casht  Campbell t Emgmtt Campbell t Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Intercept -0.0061 0.3473 -0.1657 0.4618 
 (-1.93)* (14.49)*** (-18.90)*** (30.33)*** 
Casht  -0.0606   
  (-3.51)***   
Casht-1 -0.2217    
 (-17.67)***    
Emgmtt    0.0392 
    (10.17)*** 
Emgmtt-1   0.4432  
   (95.98)***  
UC_PCAt-1 0.0087 -0.0300 -0.0586 -0.0265 
 (3.79)*** (-5.12)*** (-9.84)*** (-5.13)*** 
CC_PCAt-1 0.0005 -0.0117 -0.0018 -0.0117 
 (2.16)** (-17.21)*** (-2.70)*** (-19.92)*** 
Campbell t-1 0.0066 0.3468 -0.0250 0.3298 
 (3.39)*** (65.37)*** (-5.37)*** (65.40)*** 
Campbell t-2  -0.002  0.0187 
  (-0.48)  (4.16)*** 
Ln(MV)t 0.0013 -0.0305 -0.0061 -0.0296 
 (6.13)*** (-47.29)*** (-9.10)*** (-48.65)*** 
Leveraget -0.0183 0.5278 0.0953 0.5277 
 (-5.00)*** (68.38)*** (11.74)*** (76.81)*** 
ROAt 0.1723 -0.9538 -0.7485 -0.9240 
 (13.38)*** (-49.76)*** (-47.47)*** (-68.08)*** 
STD_Rett 0.0102 0.1508  0.1537 
 (5.25)*** (29.97)***  (34.40)*** 
Ratet  -0.0789  -1.3349 
  (-0.28)  (-7.47)*** 
Inten_RDt -0.0009 -0.0016  -0.0015 
 (-2.83)*** (-1.86)*  (-2.78)*** 
Invest_capxt -0.0981    
 (-14.88)***    
Dissuet 0.065  0.0045  
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 (8.95)***  (4.56)***  
DIVt -0.188    
 (-5.92)***    
LOSSt 0.0045    
 (2.48)**    
Turnt   0.0594  
   (34.10)***  
Growtht   0.0000  
   (-0.04)***  
SPOSt   0.0201  
   (4.13)***  
Eissuet   0.0169  
   (3.95)***  
Year and Ind. Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm-level clusters Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sample size 33,557 33,551 34,748 34,748 
R2 0.0903 0.6443 0.4035 0.5460 
The SUR regression model used in this table consists of the two equations below: 
Channelt = α10 + γ11UC_PCAt-1 + δ11CC_PCAt-1 + β11BRt-1 + θ11Channelt-1 + Controls1+ ε11 (3) 
BRt = α20 + θ21Channelt+ γ21UC_PCAt-1 + δ21CC_PCAt-1 + β21BRt-1 + β21BRt-2+ Controls2 + ε21 (4) 
where BR = Campbell, and Channel = Cash or Emgmt., Controls1 is the same as described below Table 4. The variable 
Controls2 is the same as Controls in Eq. (2) described below Table 2. 
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Table 6 Income Smoothing and Relations between Accounting Conservatism and 
Bankruptcy Risk 
 
This table reports SUR estimation results for examining whether relations between unconditional and conditional conservatism 
and bankruptcy risk are robust to the effect of income smoothing. Panels A and B use EDF and Campbell as the bankruptcy risk 
measures, respectively. Models 1 and 3 in both panels regress the inert income smoothing measure Esmooth_Inn and the 
discretionary income smoothing measure Esmooth_Dis, respectively, on the lagged unconditional and conditional conservatism 
measures UC_PCA and CC_PCA and other controls. Models 2 and 4 in both panels regress the bankruptcy risk measure EDF or 
Campbell on the lagged Esmooth_Inn and Esmooth_Dis, respectively, as well as on the lagged UC_PCA and CC_PCA and other 
controls. The t-statistics are adjusted for firm-level clusters, model details are provided below, and variable definitions are 
available in Appendix A. *, **, and *** indicate that a coefficient is significant at the 90%, 95%, and 99% confidence levels, 
respectively. 
Panel A: Estimation Results Using Conditional Bankruptcy Risk Measure EDF 
Independent Variables Esmooth_Innt EDFt Esmooth_Dist EDFt 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
UC_PCAt-1 -0.0977 -0.0480 -0.8690 -0.0470 
 (-9.83)*** (-8.48)*** (-10.29)*** (-8.47)*** 
CC_PCAt-1 -0.0018 -0.0077 -0.0241 -0.0080 
 (-1.64)* (-12.41)*** (-2.52)** (-13.09)*** 
 Esmooth_Innt-1  -0.0069   
  (-2.36)**   
Esmooth_Dist-1    -0.0004 
    (-1.15) 
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm-level clusters Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sample size 31,517 31,517 33,081 33,081 
R2 0.0501 0.6858 0.1253 0.6834 
 
Panel B: Estimation Results Using Unconditional Bankruptcy Risk Measure Campbell 
Independent Variables Esmooth_Innt Campbellt Esmooth_Dist Campbellt 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
UC_PCAt-1 -0.0972 -0.0334 -0.0950 -0.0322 
 (-9.77)*** (-5.48)*** (-10.79)*** (-5.45)*** 
CC_PCAt-1 -0.0017 -0.0114 -0.0015 -0.0113 
 (-1.51) (-16.34)*** (-1.53) (-16.75)*** 
 Esmooth_Innt-1  -0.0097   
  (-3.10)***   
Esmooth_Dist-1    -0.0094 
    (-2.81)*** 
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm-level clusters Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sample size 31,514 31,507 33,078 33,071 
R2 0.0499 0.4964 0.1281 0.6502 
The SUR model used in this table consists of the following two equations: 
Esmootht = α10 + γ11UC_PCAt-1 + δ11CC_PCAt-1 + β11BRt-1 + θ11Esmootht-1+ Controls5 + ε11   (5) 
BRt = α20 + γ21UC_PCAt-1 + δ21CC_PCAt-1 + θ21Esmootht-1 + β21BRt-1 + Controls6 + ε21  (6) 
where BR = EDF or Campbell. Esmooth refers to the inert smoothing Esmooth_Inn or discretionary smoothing Esmooth_Dis. 
Controls5 includes the firm size Ln(MV)t, return over assets ROAt, ROA volatility Volatility_ROAt, the leverage ratio Leveraget, 
and industry and year dummies Ind_Dum and Year_Dum, respectively, which are previously identified determinants of income 
smoothing. Controls6 is the same as Controls in Eq. (2) described below Table 2. 
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Table 7 The Effects of Endogeneity Issues, Extreme Distress, and CDS Contract Initiation 
 
This table reports estimation results for the effects of endogeneity problems, extreme distress, and CDS contract initiation on relations between unconditional and conditional 
conservatism and bankruptcy risk. Models 1 and 2 present the second-stage results for a two-stage approach that controls for reverse causality from bankruptcy risk to 
conservatism and endogeneity between the two types of conservatism. Models 3 and 4, Models 5 and 6, and Models 7 and 8 present results for examining the effects of the SOX 
enactment, extreme distress, and CDS contract initiation, respectively. Bankruptcy risk measures are EDF and Campbell in all models, unconditional and conditional conservatism 
measures are UC_PCAR and CC_PCAR for Models 1 and 2, which are residuals portion of unconditional and conditional conservatism free of endogeneity issues, respectively. 
Unconditional and conditional conservatism measures used for Models 3 and 8 are UC_PCA and CC_PCA. T-statistics are adjusted for firm-level clusters, model details are 
provided below, and variable definitions are provided in Appendices A. *, **, and *** indicate that a coefficient is significant at the 90%, 95%, and 99% confidence levels, 
respectively. 
Sample Size Full Sample Full Sample Subsample of Extreme Distress Subsample of Post-CDS Initiation 
Independent Variables EDFt   Campbellt EDFt Campbellt EDFt   Campbellt  EDFt Campbellt 
Model 1 Model 2  Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6  Model 7 Model 8 
Intercept 0.3346 0.3332 0.3489 0.3521 0.3346 0.3332 0.782 0.5431 
 (20.49)*** (19.76)*** (16.08)*** (14.98)*** (20.49)*** (19.76)*** (13.71)*** (11.04)*** 
UC_PCARt-1 -0.0893 -0.0946   -0.0893 -0.0946   
 (-14.82)*** (-15.52)***   (-14.82)*** (-15.52)***   
CC_PCARt-1 -0.0033 -0.0049   -0.0033 -0.0049   
 (-5.45)*** (-7.86)***   (-5.45)*** (-7.86)***   
UC_PCAt-1*SOX   -0.0516 -0.0342     
   (-4.85)*** (-3.08)***     
CC_PCAt-1*SOX   -0.0016 -0.0052     
   (-1.16) (-3.42)***     
UC_PCAt-1   -0.0319 -0.0205   -0.0266 0.0225 
   (-5.57)*** (-3.26)***   (-0.86) (0.83) 
CC_PCAt-1   -0.0080 -0.0105   -0.0002 -0.0138
   (-12.37)*** (-14.54)***   (-0.05) (-5.12)***
SOX   -0.1393 -0.0741     
   (-7.39)*** (-3.63)***     
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm-level clusters Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sample size 29,252 29,252 34,896 34,890 3, 490 3, 490 1,755 1,755 
R2 0.7080 0.6943 0.6804 0.6423 0. 4037 0.6137 0.6527 0.7356 
The OLS model used for Models 1 and 2 in this table is as follows: 
BRt = α0 + γ1CONt-1 + β1BRt-1 + β2BRt-2 + Controlst + εt                                                                                                                                                             (2) 
where BR = EDF, or Campbell. CON refers to UC_PCAR, CC_PCAR. Controls is the same as in Eq. (2) described under Table 2. 
 
The OLS model used for Models 3 and 8 in this table is as follows: 
BRt = α0 + γ0CONt-1*SOX + γ1CONt-1 + γ2SOX + γ3BOOM + β1BRt-1 + β2BRt-2 + Controlst + εt                                                                      (7) 
where BR = EDF, or Campbell. CON refers to UC_PCAR, CC_PCAR. SOX and BOOM are the indicator for SOX enactment and credit boom, respectively. Controls is the same as 
in Eq. (2) described under Table 2. 
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Table 8 Robustness Checks for Alternative Measures: Relations between Accounting Conservatism and Bankruptcy Risk 
 
This table reports the estimation results for the relations between unconditional and conditional conservatism and bankruptcy risk, using alternative bankruptcy risk and conservatism 
measures. All estimations use the OLS model except for Model 2, which uses a logit model. The bankruptcy risk measure is Zscore in Model 1, the real bankruptcy indicator Bank in 
Model 2, EDF in Models 3 to 8, and Campbell in Models 9 to 14. The unconditional and conditional conservatism measures are UC_PCA, their component measures UC_ACC, 
UC_BM, UC_RES, CC_PCA, and their component measures CC_ACM, CC_AR, and CC_CR, respectively. The t-statistics are adjusted for firm-level clusters, and variable 
definitions are available in Appendix A. *, **, and *** indicate that a coefficient is significant at the 90%, 95%, and 99% confidence level, respectively. 
  
Independent 
Variables 
Alternative 
Bankruptcy Risk  
Measures 
Alternative Unconditional and Conditional  
Conservatism Measures 
Zscoret Bankt Dependent variable is EDFt Dependent variable is Campbellt 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 Model 14
UC_PCAt-1 -0.0247 -0.9155     -0.0461 -0.0452 -0.0464   0.3363 -0.0277 -0.0322 
 (-6.93)*** (-2.45)**    (-8.54)*** (-8.90)*** (-8.60)***   (14.25)*** (-5.01)*** (-5.58)*** 
CC_PCAt-1 -0.0061 0.0128  -0.0083 -0.0084 -0.0084    -0.0116 -0.0116 -0.0115    
 (-13.70)*** (0.28) (-13.91)*** (-14.04)*** (-14.03)***    (-17.38)*** (-17.38)*** (-17.25)***    
UC_ACCt-1   -0.1166      -0.0573      
   (-5.91)***      (-2.47)***      
UC_BMt-1    -0.0298     -0.0126     
    (-7.45)***     (-3.17)***     
UC_RESt-1     -0.0206     -0.0481    
     (-2.53)**     (-4.60)***    
CC_ACMt-1      -0.026     -0.0012   
      (-1.13)     (-0.35)   
CC_ARt-1       -0.073     -0.0747  
       (-48.10)***     (-45.88)***  
CC_CRt-1        -0.0008     -0.0038 
        (-1.81)*     (-7.60)*** 
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm-level 
clusters Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sample size 33,655 30,987 34,896 34,752 34,752 34,896 34,752 34,752 34,886 34,886 34,886 34,886 34,886 34,886 
R2 0.8428  0.6808 0.6812 0.6807 0.6792 0.6709 0.6793 0.6423 0.6421 0.6423 0.6383 0.6674 0.6390 
Pseudo-R2  0.2580            
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The OLS model used for Model 1, and Models 3 to 14 in this table is as follows: 
BRt = α0 + γ1CONt-1 + β1BRt-1 + β2BRt-2 + Controlst + εt                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   (2) 
where BR = Zscore, EDF, or Campbell. CON refers to UC_PCA, CC_PCA, UC_ACC, UC_BM, UC_RES, CC_ACM, CC_AR, or CC_CR. Controls is the same as in Eq. (2) described 
under Table 2. 
The logit model used for Model 2 in this table is expressed as: 
BANKt = α +γ11UC_PCAt-1 + δ11CC_PCAt-1 + Controls7t-1 + µt                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         (8) 
where BANK is a real bankruptcy indicator equal to one if a firm went bankrupt and zero otherwise. Controls7 includes the market-based profitability measure NIMTAVG, the 
predictability of the excess return EXRETAVG, the market-to-book ratio MB, the excess firm size Rsize, the leverage ratio Leverage, the return volatility STD_Ret, the stock price 
PRICE, the risk-free rate Rate, the R&D intensity Inten_RD, and the industry and year dummies Ind_Dum and Year_Dum, respectively.  
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